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RECENT DECISIONS
INTERNATIONAL LAW - THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION
TO EXTRADITION: A 19TH CENTURY BRITISH STANDARD IN 20TH
CENTURY AMERICAN COURTS
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is currently review-
ing a grant of habeas corpus to a Provisional Irish Republican Army
("PIRA") member previously certified for extradition to the United
Kingdom.' In the United Kingdom, the accused, William Joseph
Quinn, faces charges of murder and conspiracy to cause bomb explo-
sions.2 Pursuant to the United States-United Kingdom extradition
treaty,3  the United Kingdom government formally requested
Quinn's extradition in November, 1981. At his extradition hearing,
Quinn contended that his alleged crimes were political acts within
the treaty's political offense exception clause 4 and that, therefore, he
1 Quinn v. Robinson, No. C-82-6688 RPA (N.D. Cal., Oct. 3, 1983).
2 Id. at 2.
3 Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, United States-United Kingdom, 28 U.S.T. 227,
T.I.A.S. No. 8468 [hereinafter cited as Treaty]. The extradition process typically consists of
the following steps. The foreign government communicates its request for the accused's re-
turn to the United States through diplomatic channels. Treaty, art. VII. The United States
government then applies to a federal magistrate for a provisional arrest warrant on behalf of
the foreign government. The magistrate may grant this request if an extradition treaty is in
effect, if the offenses charged are within its provisions, and if the accused is within the magis-
trate's jurisdiction. Treaty, art. VII; 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1982). The foreign government then
must request extradition formally within 45 days of the accused's arrest, Treaty, art. VIII,
which request must include the accused's name and nationality, the facts of the offense(s), the
text of the law involved, and a warrant of arrest issued by the proper authority of the foreign
government. Treaty, art. VII.
The federal magistrate then holds an extradition hearing to decide whether there is suffi-
cient evidence according to United States law to justify committing the accused for trial if the
offense charged had been committed in the United States. Treaty, art. IX. The Supreme
Court held in Benson v. McMahon, 127 U.S. 457 (1888), that this requires a finding of prob-
able cause akin to that at a preliminary hearing in criminal cases. The magistrate will deny
extradition if he determines the evidence is insufficient; this denial is final and not subject to
direct appeal. United States v. Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 125-30 (2d Cir. 1981). However, if the
magistrate finds the evidence sufficient, he will grant extradition and certify the defendant's
extradition to the Secretary of State. 18 U.S.C. § 3184. The accused thereafter may petition
for writ of habeas corpus to secure his release. Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502 (1896). If the
judiciary certifies extradition, the Secretary of State then will decide whether to allow the
extradition. 18 U.S.C. § 3188 (1982); see Note, Executive Discretion in Extradition, 62 COLUM. L.
REV. 1313 (1962).
4 Treaty, supra note 3, art. V provides:
(1) Extradition shall not be granted if:
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was protected from extradition.5 The federal magistrate rejected this
allegation and granted the United Kingdom's request in September,
1982.6 Quinn subsequently petitioned for writ of habeas corpus in
federal district court. In October, 1983, the district court judge ac-
cepted Quinn's political offense argument and granted his release.
7
The United States, on behalf of the United Kingdom, has appealed
the decision to the Ninth Circuit.
In Quinn v. Robinson, the Ninth Circuit faces a question with judi-
cial, international, and societal implications. The judicial signifi-
cance stems from the failure of United States' extradition treaties to
define the phrase "offense of a political character."8 Courts have
stated that their statutory grant of power over extradition requests
includes the power to interpret the political offense exception clause.9
Lower federal courts and magistrates currently employ nineteenth-
century standards in interpreting the exception. However, these
standards are inadequate for dealing with extraditions that involve
terrorists. As one writer noted, United States magistrates and district
courts are attempting "to cope with modern terrorism through legal
tests and procedures which predate the advent of air travel, guerilla
warfare and urban revolution." 10 In Quinn, the Ninth Circuit has a
valuable opportunity to modernize the political offense standard
(c)(i) the offense for which extradition is requested is regarded by the requested
Party as one of apolitical character; or
(ii) the person sought proves that the request for his extradition has, in fact, been
made with a view to try or punish him for an ofeae ofa political character (emphasis
added).
5 In re Quinn, No. Cr-81-146 Misc. at 78 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 28, 1982).
6 Id. at 111-12.
7 Quinn, No. C-82-6688 RPA at 5.
8 Hannay, International Terrorism and the Political Ofense Exception to Extradition, 18 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 381, 385 (1980).
9 See In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103, 113 (1852); United States v. Mackin, 668 F.2d
122, 136 (2d Cir. 1981); Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 513 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
894 (1981).
Courts are granted power to decide extradition requests under 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1982).
See note 3 supra. However, requesting governments often argue that the political offense ex-
ception should be decided by the executive branch. Judge Friendly addressed this contention
at length in Mackin. In finding that courts have jurisdiction to decide the political offense
question, Congress could have expressly excluded the political offense issue in the general
grant of extradition power in § 3184, but had not. 668 F.2d at 137. Judge Friendly also
pointed out that the judiciary's involvement helped to ensure impartiality and to depoliticize
the issue. Id. at 134-35. He finally noted that it was for Congress, if it so chose, to alter the
existing procedure, which is based on over a century of case law. Id. at 135, 137.
10 Lubet, Extradition Reform: Executive Discretion and Judicial Participation in the Extradition of
Political Terrorists, 15 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 247, 254 (1982).
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within its own jurisdiction," and to influence trends in other
jurisdictions.
On an international level, extradition cases in general, and polit-
ical offense cases in particular, affect a government's foreign rela-
tions. By refusing extradition requests, especially on political offense
grounds, a government implies its doubt about both the requesting
country's good faith and its legal system's integrity. Moreover, the
requesting country may see an extradition denial as an endorsement
of the accused's actions. 12 Finally, the judiciary in both countries
party to an extradition treaty may interpret the treaty's political of-
fense clause differently, resulting in one country extraditing more of-
fenders than the other. A continued and serious imbalance in the
number of extraditions could harm relations between the countries,
and even provoke abandonment of the treaty.
The Ninth Circuit's delimitation of the political offense excep-
tion in Quinn also could have significant societal implications. One
judge recently expressed the concern that too freely applying the
political offense exception could make the United States a terrorist
haven, with no guarantee of their peaceful conduct while they re-
main in the United States.' 3 Just as late nineteenth-century Euro-
pean courts adapted their application of the political offense
exception to deal with anarchists,' 4 now the United States courts
must adapt their application of the exception to deal with terrorists.
This comment examines the American courts' application of the
political offense exception. Part I details the historical purposes and
evolution of the exception. Part II explores current American devel-
11 The Ninth Circuit precedent is a highly criticized case involving Yugoslavia's request
for the return of an alleged war criminal, Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir.
1957), vacatedandremanded, 355 U.S. 393 (1958), surrender denied on remandsub nom. United States
v. Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. 383 (S.D. Cal. 1959). See note 63 infia.
12 I. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 192 (1971). The United States is
especially vulnerable to these accusations in IRA cases, given popular support in America for
the Irish nationalist movement.
13 Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d at 520. However, a grant of political offender status and
exemption from extradition does not protect the offender from deportation. 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1182(a)(28), 1251(a)(1), (6)(1982). Deportation, the unilateral expulsion of an alien, see
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713-14 (1983), has been referred to for this
reason as "disguised extradition." I. SHEARER, supra note 12, at 78; O'Higgins, Disguised Ex-
iradition: The Sablen Case, 27 MOD. L. REV. 521, 530-31 (1964). Further, deportation is not an
unusual step; Desmond Mackin, see note 8 supra, was deported from the United States to the
Republic of Ireland after United States courts denied his extradition. N.Y. Times, Dec. 31,
1981, at 22, col. 5.
14 See text accompanying note 49 infia.
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opments in this area. Part III discusses the factors in, and ramifica-
tions of, the most recent case, Quinn v. Robinson.
I. Historical Development
The United States Supreme Court has defined extradition as
"the surrender of a criminal by a foreign state to which he has fled
for refuge from prosecution to the state within whose jurisdiction the
crime was committed upon the demand of the latter state, in order
that he may be dealt with according to its laws."15 Most countries
will surrender a fugutive only if an extradition treaty is in force.
16
An Egyptian pharaoh and a Hittite king negotiated the first-known
such treaty in the thirteenth century B.C. 17 During centuries of ab-
solute monarchies thereafter, rulers used these treaties primarily to
obtain custody of fugitive political offenders rather than common
criminals.' 8 Monarchs complied with extradition requests to ensure
the continued reign of an ally and to guarantee reciprocal
treatment. '9
After the Enlightenment, theorists such as John Stuart Mill
championed the individual's right to rebel against oppressive govern-
ments.20 Revolutions replaced many absolute monarchies with dem-
ocratic governments that were more concerned with human rights.
Accordingly, public opinion turned against returning political of-
fenders to states where they would face hostile judges and summary
trials.21 In this period, as one writer stated, the political offense
evolved from "what was the extraditable offense par excellence to
what has since become the non-extraditable offense par excellence.
'22
15 Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (1902).
16 The United States, for example, recognizes a legal right to demand extradition and a
correlative duty to comply with such requests only when an extradition treaty exists. Absent
such a treaty, a government may choose to grant extradition on the principle of comity be-
tween nations, but it is under no obligation to so act. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 176,
187 (1933); see also Valentine v. United States ex rd. Neideker, 229 U.S. 5, 7-13 (1936); United
States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 412-14 (1886); McElvy v. Civiletti, 523 F. Supp. 42, 47
(S.D. Fla. 1981); Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1219 n.59 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
17 I. SHEARER, Supra note 12, at 5.
18 M. BASSIONI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD ORDER 4-5 (1974).
19 Id.
20 J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 2 (A. Costell ed. 1947).
21 I. SHEARER, supra note 12, at 5. This concern is still a factor in judicial decisions. See
text accompanying note 50 infra.
22 M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 18, at 371. The French Revolution had a profound impact
on this evolution. It is not coincidental that France was among the first countries to include




In the mid-nineteenth century, Western countries began includ-
ing clauses exempting political offenders in their extradition trea-
ties.23 However, because the treaties did not define "political
offenses," courts had difficulty putting the exception into practice.
2 4
Nevertheless, courts quickly recognized two distinct categories of
political offenses: "pure" and "relative.
'25
In pure political offenses, the accused has directly injured a right
of the government.26 Eventually, countries specifically excluded
these offenses from the list of extraditable crimes in their treaties.
27
Courts, therefore, seldom dealt with extraditions involving these pure
offenses; they could deny extradition on the ground that the offense
charged was not a listed crime.28 The second category of political
acts identified by courts, the relative political offense, involved com-
mon crimes, such as murder or robbery, committed for political mo-
tives or in a political context.2 9 In contrast to pure political crimes,
these relative offenses, because of their mixed nature, presented
courts with classification problems. For guidance, courts looked to
the aim of the political offense exception: "[T]o protect those violent
acts which are necessary and corollary to political activity, not to
sanction gratuitous assaults on human life."
'30
Judges in different countries developed three distinct tests in ap-
plying the political offense exception: the French objective test, the
Swiss predominance test, and the Anglo-American incidence test.3 '
23 S ee I. SHEARER, supra note 12, at 16.
24 See M. BASSIOUNI,supra note 18, at 371-72 (stating that by its very nature the political
offense exception defies precise definition, and arguing that this promotes a necessary flex-
ibility of the concept).
25 For detailed discussion of the distinction between pure and relative political offenses,
see Bassiouni, Ideologically Motivated Ofenses and the Political Offese Exception in Extradition - A
ProposedJuridical Standardfor an Unruly Problem, 19 DE PAUL L. REV. 217, 245-54 (1969); Can-
trell, The Political Ofemse Exception in Extradition: A Comparison of the United States, Great Britain
and the Republic of Ireland, 60 MARQ. L. REV. 777, 780-82 (1977); Garcia-Mora, The Nature of
Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem of Extradition Law, 48 VA. L. REV. 1226, 1230-39 (1962);
Lubet & Czackes, The Role of the American Judicia in the Extradition of Political Terrorists, 71 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 193, 200-01 (1980).
26 Garcia-Mora, supra note 25, at 1230.
27 See I. SHEARER, supra note 12, at 182.
28 Id. In "no list" treaties, the parties merely provide for extradition between the signato-
ries and do not enumerate the offenses covered. Because no offenses are designated specifi-
cally, none are excluded. Therefore, the court must address the political offense issue because
it cannot deny extradition on the ground that the offense is not covered by the treaty.
29 See note 25 supra.
30 Lubet & Czackes, supra note 25, at 194-95.
31 Commentators have consistently used these three categories. For a full analysis of the
categories, see Carbonneau, The Political Ofense Exception to Extradition and Transnational Ter-
rorists. Old Doctrine Reformulated and New Nors Created, 1 A.S.I.L.S. INT'L L.J. 1, 10-33 (1977);
[Vol. 59:1005]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
The French objective test granted political offender status only when
the accused's acts directly injured rights of the State.3 2 In the most
representative case, In re Giovanni Gatti,33 the San Marino government
asked France to extradite the defendant whom they had charged
with the attempted murder of a Communist party member.34 The
defendant contended that he had acted for political reasons.35 The
French court granted extradition, unconvinced by this political of-
fense argument. The court declared that an offense derives its char-
acter not from the motive of the accused, but rather from the nature
of the rights it injures.36 Therefore, the court stated, to be of apolit-
ical character, an act must affect rights of the state.37 By thus formu-
lating their objective test, French courts severely restricted the scope
of the political offense exception, limiting it to only pure political
acts and automatically excluding relative political acts. 38
Under their predominance test, Swiss courts deny extradition
when the political elements outweigh, or "predominate" over, the
common elements of a crime.3 9 A Swiss court, in In re Vogi,40 listed
the pertinent factors in making this decision: the accused's motiva-
tion, the circumstances surrounding his commission of the crime, and
the proportion between the political objective and the means
Garcia-Mora, supra note 25, at 1240-56; Note, American Courts and Modern Terrorism: The Politics
of Extradition, 13 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 617, 624-32 (1981).
32 Carbonneau, supra note 31, at 18.
33 Ct. of Appeals, Grenoble, Fr., 1947 Ann. Dig. 145 (Case No. 70).
34 Id. at 145.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 145-46.
37 Id. at 145.
38 French courts soon modified their rigid test. In a case decided six years after Gatti, a
French court denied Spain's request for the extradition of the accused on charges of arson and
murder, stating his acts were "at least relative political offenses." The defendant had alleged
Spain actually sought him because of his opposition to the Franco government. In re Rodri-
guez, Ct. of Appeals, Paris, Fr., 2 Gaz. Palais 113 (1953). One commentator has noted that
subsequent French cases have adopted an approach similar to that of the Swiss predominance
test. See Carbonneau,supra note 31, at 20. For an in-depth analysis of the most recent French
cases, see Carbonneau, The Political Offense Exception as Applied in French Cases Dealing with the
Extradition of Terrorists." The Quest for an Appropriate Doctrinal Analysis Revisited, in TRANSNA-
TIONAL ASPECTS OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 209 (Mich. Y.B. Int'l Legal Stud. 1983).
39 See note 31 supra. The Swiss approach is based on their extradition statute:
[E]xtradition is not granted for political offenses. It is granted, however, even when
the guilty person alleges a political motive or end, if the act for which it has been
requested constitutes primarily a common offense. The Federal Tribunal decides
liberally in each particular instance upon the character of the infraction according
to the facts of the case.
Federal Extradition Law of Jan. 22, 1892, at 10, Harvard Research in International Law,
Extradition, 29 AM. J. INT'L LAW 423 (Supp. 1935) (Switz.) (unofficial translation).
40 Fed. Ct., Switz., 1923-24 Ann. Dig. 285 (Case No. 165).
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adopted to achieve it.4 1 In Vogt, the court felt that the accused's
political objective, the removal of police from his district during food
riots, did not outweigh the means he used, taking innocent civilian
hostages. In granting extradition, the court noted that as the means
adopted become increasingly extreme, the political justification must
correspondingly intensify in order for the political offense exception
to be granted.
42
The Swiss predominance test, therefore, unlike the French ob-
jective test, encompasses pure and relative political offenses. More-
over, its flexible mechanism for balancing objective and subjective
factors is uniquely tailored to assist courts in assessing relative polit-
ical acts.
Anglo-American courts have derived their incidence test 43 from
the 1891 case Zn re Castioni,44 where the British court stated the test
for a political offense exception as:
[W]hether, upon the facts, it is clear that the man was acting as
one of a number of persons engaged in acts of violence of a polit-
ical character with a political object, and as part of the political
movement and [up]rising in which he was taking part.45
Courts of both the United Kingdom and the United States have
relied explicitly on Castioni in political offense exception cases. Each
country, however, has developed its own version of the standard.
Since In re Meunier46 in 1894, British courts have required that the
acts be incidental to and in furtherance of a two-party struggle for
political power. In Meunier, France had requested extradition of an
anarchist charged with bombing a cafe and a military barracks. 47
The English court denied the accused political offender status and
granted extradition because he was not engaged in a two-party strug-
41 Id. at 285.
42 Id. Ktir v. Minist~re Public F~d~ral, Fed. Trib., Switz., 34 I.L.R. 143 (1961), demon-
strates the flexibility of the Swiss approach. In Kir, France requested the surrender of an
Algerian Liberation Movement member charged with murdering a suspected traitor. The
Swiss court granted extradition, declaring that the defendant's undoubted political motiva-
tion failed to invest the common crime with aprdominantly political character. Id. at 143-44.
The seriousness of the act of murder necessitated that it be "the sole means of attaining the
political aim" in order for the political ends to outweigh the method used and make the
transaction predominantly political. Id. at 144.
43 See note 31 sura.
44 [1891] 1 Q.B. 149. Castioni was a Swiss national wanted by the Swiss government for
shooting a government official during a protest.
45 Id. at 159.
46 [1894] 2 Q.B. 415.
47 Id. at 415.
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gle for political power. 48 The court declared that, since anarchists
seek to destroy all governments rather than to substitute one form of
government for another, they are not entitled to the protection of the
political offense exception.
49
British courts have applied the incidence test flexibly in certain
situations. For example, in Regina v. Governor of Brixion exparte Kolczyn-
ski,50 an English court refused to extradite Polish sailors even though
Poland had charged them with extraditable offenses which were not
committed during a two-party struggle. The defendants, who had
mutinied and sailed their trawler into a British port, contended that
if they were returned, their totalitarian government might It them
for the charged offenses, but wouldpunish them for treason in fleeing
to a Western country.5' The court accepted their argument and de-
nied extradition, emphasizing that the words "offense of a political
character" must always be considered "according to the circum-
stances existing at the time," and that "[t]he present time is very dif-
ferent from 1891 when Castionis case was decided."
52
In contrast to the British judiciary, American courts have nar-
rowly interpreted the Castioni test.53 In 1894, an American court first
adopted the Castioni incidence test in In re Ezeta .54 In Ezeta, the Sal-
vadoran government had requested the extradition of a defendant
who faced murder and robbery charges. 55 The court refused the re-
quest on political offense grounds, finding that the defendant had
acted in support of a contending faction during a rebellion.
56
48 Id. at 419.
49 Id.
50 [19551 1 Q.B. 540.
51 Id. at 548.
52 Id. at 549. However, British courts indicated in Schtraks v. Government of Isr., [1962]
3 All Eng. 529 (H.L.), that their flexibility was limited. Israel sought the defendant's extradi-
tion on the charge of violating an Israeli court order to return a child to his parents. The
defendant had refused to obey the court order and had fled to the United Kingdom because
he feared the parents would not give the child a strict Jewish orthodox upbringing. The
House of Lords declared that, as the defendant's acts were not politically motivated and were
not protected political offenses, he should be extradited. Id. at 536, 540-41. They continued:
[I]t is still necessary to have that connexion [between the uprising and political of-
fense]. It is not departed from by taking a liberal view as to what is meant by
disturbance. . ., provided the idea of political opposition as between fugitive and
requested State is not lost sight of. ...
Id. at 540.
53 See text accompanying note 45 supra.
54 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894).
55 Id. at 975-76. The defendant, a general in the previous regime, had ccmmitted the
alleged crimes during the rebellion by which the requesting government came to power.
56 Id. at 1004-05.
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In the 1896 case, Ome/as v. Rut',, 5 7 the Supreme Court in dicta
listed four factors pertinent to a political offense inquiry: (1) the
character of the foray; (2) the mode of the attack; (3) the persons
killed or captured; and (4) the kind of property taken or destroyed.58
Lower American courts, however, apparently ignored the Court's
guidance in Ruz, and, relying on Castioni, established the following
requirements for the political offense exception: (1) the existence of a
political uprising or a political disturbance; and (2) acts incidental to
or in furtherance of the political disturbance.59 By dismissing the
Ruzi factors, courts reduced their inquiry to an occurrence-based ap-
proach.60 If a defendant acted during a political uprising, his act was
a political offense;61 conversely, if a defendant did not act during
such an uprising, the act was not a political offense and thus not
protected.62 This approach has yielded anomalous63 and severely
57 161 U.S. 502 (1896). Mexico accused the defendant of killing and injuring civilians in
a Mexican border town allegedly during a revolutionary movement. Id. at 510.
58 Id. at 511. The Ruiz Court declined to rule directly on the political offense issue,
instead allowing extradition on the ground that the district court had improperly granted
habeas corpus, barring the defendant's extradition. Id. at 512.
59 See, e.g., Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1104 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1036 (1980); Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 173 (2d Cir. 1980); Garcia-Guillern v.
United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989 (1972); In re
Gonzalez, 217 F. Supp. 717, 721 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Ramos v. Diaz, 179 F. Supp. 459, 463 (S.D.
Fla. 1959).
60 See Garcia-Mora, supra note 25, at 1246 (suggesting that so long as the alleged act
occurred during the disturbance, American courts would find the political offense exception
applicable).
61 See, e.g., In re Ezeta, 62 F. at 1002; Ramos v. Dz-, 179 F. Supp. at 462-63.
62 See, e.g., Escobedo, 623 F.2d at 1104; Garcia-Guillem, 450 F.2d at 1192; In re Gonzalez, 217
F. Supp. at 721.
63 For instance, in one case, a war criminal charged with interning and executing inno-
cent citizens was protected by the exception because his acts occurred during World War II.
Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1957), vacated and remanded, 355 U.S. 393
(1958), surrender denied on remand sub nom. United States v. Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. 383 (S.D.
Cal. 1959). Yet in another case, a military guard accused of murdering two prisoners was not
protected by the exception because no uprising was actually in progress at the time the acts
allegedly occurred. In re Gonzalez, 217 F. Supp. at 721.
Although this note focuses on violent offenses, the political offense exception has been
used as a defense to non-violent charges. Application of the occurrence test has produced
anomalous results here, too. In two cases with highly similar fact patterns, one deposed leader
successfully invoked the political offense defense against embezzlement charges, In re
Mylonas, 187 F. Supp. 716 (N.D. Ala. 1960), while another was extradited, Jimenez v. Aris-
teguieta, 311 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1962). The My/onas court found that the crimes charged
occurred during a political uprising despite the absence of supporting facts. In contrast, the
Jiminez court found the alleged financial crimes were not political, given the absence of a
political uprising. One commentator suggests the United States government's political moti-
vations, rather than the political offense exception standard, produced the anomalous results.
[Vol. 59:1005]
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criticized results.64
One factor contributing to the inconsistency of American deci-
sions is the societal changes that have taken place since American
courts originally adopted the Castioni test.65 Specifically, modern-day
terrorism has posed new problems for courts applying the Castioni
nineteenth-century incidence standard. In several recent cases in-
volving requests to extradite terrorists, courts have reexamined this
standard.
II. Current American Developments
In three recent cases, In re McMullen,66 Eain v. Wilkes,67 and
United States v. Mackin,68 American courts have considered whether
the political offense exception protects alleged terrorist acts. In Mc-
Mullen, the magistrate adhered to the traditional political offense ap-
plication and denied extradition. 69  However, the Eain court
developed a narrower approach by redefining the "uprising" and
"incidence" elements. 70 In so doing, the court provided a viable
framework for distinguishing between terrorist acts and offenses of a
political character. In Mackin, the Second Circuit implicitly ap-
proved the Eain approach by affirming a magistrate's opinion which
explicitly endorsed Eain .71
In In re McMullen, British authorities requested extradition of an
IRA member charged with attempted murder in connection with the
bombing of a military barracks in England.72 McMullen asserted
that his acts came within the political offense exception and that ex-
Epps, The Validity of the Political Offender Exception in Extradition Treaties in Anglo-Americanjuris-
prudence, 20 HARV. INT'L LJ. 61, 74 (1979).
64 The American approach has been criticized as being both under-inclusive and over-
inclusive. The rule is underinclusive because it excludes all political offenses not part of a
general political disturbance, and overinclusive because it potentially protects all acts com-
mitted during a political disturbance without regard for the character of the crime or the
crime's victim. See Lubet & Czackes, supra note 25, at 203-04.
65 See note 54 supra.
66 No. 3-78-1899 M.G. (N.D. Cal., May 11, 1979), reprinted in Extradition Act of 1981: Hear-
ings on S. 1639 Before the Senate Comm. on theJudicia,7, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 294, 294-96 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on S 16391.
67 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
68 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981), affg In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. I (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13,
1981), reprinted in Hearings on S. 1639, supra note 66, at 140-239.
69 In re McMullen, No. 3-78-1899 M.G., reprinted in Hearings on S. 1639, supra note 66, at
294.
70 641 F.2d at 518-23.
71 Aackin, 668 F.2d at 137; see also notes 81-86 infra and accompanying text.




tradition should therefore be denied. The magistrate listed the ele-
ments of the political offense exception: 1) the act must have occured
during an uprising and the accused must be a member of the group
participating in the uprising; 2) the accused must be a person en-
gaged in acts of political violence with a political end.73 The magis-
trate found these elements satisfied and therefore denied extradition
on political offense grounds.
74
In Bain v. Wilkes, Israel requested extradition of an alleged mem-
ber of the Palestinian Liberation Organization ("PLO") charged
with exploding a bomb in the marketplace of an Israeli city.75 Eain
challenged the extradition on the basis of the political offense excep-
tion in an argument paralleling that used successfully by McMul-
len.76 However, unlike the magistrate in McMullen, the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that the bombing was not in-
cidental to an uprising and granted extradition. 77 The court intro-
duced a new rationale for determining the political offense issue: to
be incidental to a disturbance, the court stated, a direct tie must exist
between the perpetrator, a political organization's political goals,
and the specific act. 78 More importantly, the court declared that the
only acts legitimately part of a political disturbance are those that
"disrupt thepolitical structure of a state, and not the social structure that
established the government. ' 79 The court found that because Eain
had indiscriminately bombed a civilian target, his act was not a pro-
tected political offense.80
73 Id. (citing Castioni, [1891] 1 Q.B. 149 and Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198 (9th
Cir. 1957)).
74 Id. at 296. The magistrate found that: (1) a violent political disturbance existed in
Northern Ireland at the time of McMullen's alleged act; (2) the PIRA was involved in that
uprising; (3) defendant was a member of the PIRA; and (4) the offenses allegedly committed
were part of the PIRA's political campaign in Northern Ireland. Id. at 295.
75 641 F.2d at 507.
76 See note 74 supra and accompanying text. Eain introduced evidence to show: (1) the
existence of a violent political disturbance at the time of his alleged act; (2) the involvement
of the PLO in that disturbance; (3) his.membership in the PLO; and (4) the alleged acts were
part of the PLO's resistance to the Israeli presence. 641 F.2d at 518.
77 Id. at 523. The court previously had found that "the operative definition of 'political
offenses' under extradition treaties as construed by the United States limits such offenses to
acts committed in the course of and incidental to a violent political disturbance, such as a
war, revolution or rebellion." Id. at 518.
78 Id. at 520.
79 Id. at 520-21 (emphasis added).
80 Id. at 523. The court relied on and quoted extensively from In re Meunier, [1894] 2
Q.B. 415, in its decision. While stating that Eain was not an anarchist, the court felt that his
"anarchist-like" behavior was sufficiently close to Meunier's to warrant exclusion from the
political offense exception. Id. at 521-22.
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In United States v. Mackin, the United Kingdom sought the return
of an Irish Republican Army ("IRA") member accused of the at-
tempted murder of a British soldier in Belfast, Northern Ireland, and
illegal possession of firearms and ammunition.8' The magistrate's
formulation of the political offense exception elements was similar to
that of the In re McMullen magistrate's.8 2 However, the magistrate in
Mackin also explicitly endorsed the Eain court's direct link require-
ment.83 In denying extradition, the magistrate emphasized that
while Mackin's acts were directed against military personnel, Eain's
had been aimed at civilians:
[11f the offense committed was anarchistic in nature and focused
toward the disruption of the social fabric rather than the political
structure of the State, we would not conclude that the act bore
any connection to the political activity nor that it was committed
"in furtherance" of a political uprising.
8 4
The United States appealed the magistrate's non-extradition or-
der and, alternatively, petitioned for a writ of mandamus to require
the magistrate to grant extradition. 85 The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that the magistrate's opinion was not appealable
and, because the magistrate had not exceeded her jurisdiction in de-
ciding the alleged acts were political offenses, there existed no basis
for a writ of mandamus.
8 6
These three cases reflect American courts' shifting attitude to-
ward the application of the political offense exception.87 The McMul-
81 668 F.2d at 124.
82 See text accompanying note 73 supra. The magistrate stated the political offense in-
quiry as:
(1) whether there was a war, rebellion, revolution or political uprising at the time
and site of the commission of the offense;
(2) whether Mackin was a member of the uprising group; and
(3) whether the offense was "incidental to" and "in further of" the political
uprising.
In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, reprinted in Hearings on S. 1639, supra note 66, at 186. The
Mackin magistrate "distilled" these standards from the case law. Id. at 166-74.
83 Id. at 235-38. See text accompanying note 78 supra. The magistrate felt that because
Mackin's acts were directed against military personnel, whereas Eain's were directed at civil-
ians, "the well-reasoned limitations circumscribing the application of the political offense ex-
ception set forth in. . . Eain v. Wilkes [were] inappropriate in the case before us." Id. at 237-
38.
84 Id. at 237.
85 668 F.2d at 123.
86 Id. at 137.
87 For a comparative discussion of these three cases, see Lubet, supra note 10, at 254-56;
Murphy, Legal Controls and the Deterrence of Terrorism: Performance and Prospects, 13 RUTGERS L.J.
465, 479-80 (1982); Sternberg & Skelding, State Department Determination of Political Offenses:
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len magistrate, while slightly varying the traditional statement of the
standard, followed a broadly scoped inquiry, denying extradition if
the act occurred during, and was incidental to, a political uprising.
The Seventh Circuit in Eain, while using a similar definition, re-
quired a much closer link between the perpetrator, the political or-
ganization's goals, and the act. The Eain court thus separated
terrorist acts from protected conduct under the exception, a result
more consistent with the philosophy underlying the exception.88 In
Mackin, the Second Circuit indicated its support for this develop-
ment. Quinn now provides the Ninth Circuit with the opportunity to
reconsider its position.
III. Quinn v. Robinson
United Kingdom officials have charged William Joseph Quinn,
an alleged PIRA member,89 with murder and conspiracy to cause
bomb explosions. Quinn allegedly conspired with PIRA members in
planning a series of bomb incidents between 1974 and 1975, directed
at military, governmental, and civilian targets. 90 Quinn also alleg-
edly shot and killed an off-duty, out-of-uniform police constable. 9t
In May, 1975, while the Northern Ireland government was hold-
ing Quinn on unrelated charges, a witness in the United Kingdom
Death Knellfor the Political Ofense Exception in Extradition Law, 15 CASE W. Rt.s.J. INT'L L. 137,
150-52 (1983). Eain is discussed separately in Case Comment, Eain v. Wilkes: Establishing the
Parameters of the Political Offense Exception in Extradition Treaties, 10 DENVER J. INT'L L. POL'Y
596 (1981).
88 See text accompanying note 30 supra.
89 The PIRA is a militant offshoot of the Irish Republican Army dedicated to using
terrorist methods to achieve the removal of the British from Northern Ireland. See In re Mack-
in, 80 Cr. Misc. 1,reprinted in Hearings on S 1639, supra note 66, at 198-204, In re Quinn, CR-81-
146 Misc. at 86-88.
90 Quinn, No. C-82-6688 RPA, at 5-8 (N.D. Cal., Oct. 3, 1983). The Roman Catholic
Bishop to the British Armed Forces, a Crown Court Judge, and the Chairman of the Daily
Express newspaper each received a letter bomb during this period. In other incidents, police
discovered bombs in a Hampshire County railroad station, a London pub and a London
restaurant. On all these occasions, police matched fingerprints on the bombs, or their wrap-
pings, to those of Quinn and/or those of his alleged co-conspirators. In addition, police found
the alleged co-conspirators' fingerprints throughout two flats which contained bomb-making
materials.
91 Id. at 8-11. Upon emerging from a flat which was later found to contain bomb-mak-
ing materials, a man was stopped and questioned by a police constable. He ran off when the
constable, suspicious of his actions and nervous behavior, attempted to search him. An off-
duty constable noticed the chase. He blocked the suspect's path, whereupon the man pulled a
gun and shot him three times, causing the constable's death.
For detailed account of charges and surrounding facts, see In re Quinn, CR-81-146 Misc.
at 9-58.
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identified him as the constable's murderer. 92 Sometime in 1976,
Quinn, a United States citizen, returned to the United States.
United Kingdom authorities traced Quinn to California and insti-
tuted extradition proceedings.
At the magistrate's hearing, Quinn attempted to block his extra-
dition by asserting the political offense exception. 93 In his opinion,
the magistrate stated the appropriate inquiry for denying extradition
through the political offense exception:
1. Whether there was a war, rebellion, revolution or political
uprising at the time and place of the offenses;
2. Whether Quinn was a member of the uprising group; and
3. Whether the offenses for which extradition is sought were
"incidental to" and "in furtherance of" the political uprising.94
Relying extensively on the Eain court's approach, 95 the magistrate
found that Quinn failed this test because he did not prove he was a
member of the uprising group and because his acts were not inciden-
tal to a political disturbance. 96 The district court, however, rejected
the magistrate's formulation of the test, his reliance on Eain, and his
finding. The district judge limited the requirements to:
1. Each charged offense must have been committed at a time of
an uprising, or other violent political disturbance, such as war,
revolution, or rebellion; and
2. Each charged offense must have been incidental to and in the
course of the uprising or violent political disturbance.
97
The district court then applied a traditional approach, similar to
that used in McMullen,9 and denied extradition.99
Both the magistrate and the district court included a political
disturbance and an incidence requirement in their definitions of the
political offense exception. 100 However, the district court specifically
rejected the magistrate's membership requirement. The judge stated
92 Id. at 9-10.
93 Id. at 78.
94 Id at 80. The magistrate's requirements paralleled those used by the magistrate in
Mackin. See note 82 supra and accompanying text.
95 See notes 75-80 supra.
96 In re Quinn, CR-81-146 Misc. at 98, 106, 109.
97 Quinn, No. C-82-6688 RPA, at 16. The district judge cited the following cases as prece-
dent for the two requiremernts: Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 (5th
Cir. 197 1),cert. denied 405 U.S. 989 (1972); Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 173 (2d Cir. 1981);
Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 518 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
98 See note 73-74 supra and accompanying text.
99 Quinn, No. C-82-6688 RPA at 40, 44.
100 See notes 94, 97 supra and accompanying text.
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that no English or American precedent supported this requirement
and, therefore, "such an additional requirement to invoking the ex-
ception [was] unwarranted."' 0 1 An analysis of precedent, however,
confirms that authority for such a requirement does in fact exist.
In the original English case, In re Castioni,10 2 mention of the
membership element recurred throughout the decision. Judge Den-
man stated in his opinion that a political act must be committed
during "a dispute between two parties in the State."10 3 Similarly, in
his concurring opinion, Judge Hawkins declared that a political of-
fender was someone "taking part in a movement. . . which he chose
to join. . for the benefit of thepolitical side to which he desired to attach
himself' 10 4 Moreover, British courts since 1894 have specified that
the accused must be a member of a "two-party struggle" to qualify
under the political offense exception.
0 5
In early American cases, courts established a de facto member-
ship requirement by granting political offender status only to defend-
ants who were members of either the existing government or the
rebel forces. 106 In two more recent American cases, Mackin and Mc-
Mullen, magistrates expressly included a membership requirement in
the standard. 0 7 In Eain v. Wilkes, although the Seventh Circuit did
not expressly list membership as a requirement, the court affirmed
the magistrate's finding that membership must be tied to the specific
act alleged.' 08
101 Quinn, No. C-82-6688 RPA at 17.
102 [1891] 1 Q.B. 149.
103 Id at 156 (emphasis added).
104 Id. at 166 (emphasis added).
105 In re Meunier, [1894] 2 Q.B. 415; see text accompanying notes 46-49 supra.
106 Three cases in particular illustrate this point. In In re Ezeta, 62 F. 972, 997 (N.D. Cal.
1894), the court refused to extradite the defendant on political offense grounds, noting that he
was a military officer and a member of the "contending forces." Similarly, in Ramos v. Diaz,
179 F. Supp. 459 (S.D. Fla. 1959), the court held that since the defendants were officers in
Castro's revolutionary army, the political offense barred their extradition. And, in Karadzole
v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1957), the court refused to extradite a former member of
the Croatian government for war crimes he committed during World War I.
The Supreme Court also discussed the significance of defendant's political affiliation in
Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502 (1896). The Court upheld the magistrate's holding of extradi-
tion and his finding that the accused were "bandits, without uniform or flag." Id. at 510.
However, membership, while necessary, will not be sufficient absent a political distur-
bance. See, e.g., Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1971), In re Gonza-
lez, 217 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (absent a political uprising, acts of military personnel
or former government officials are not political offenses). Cf. In re Mylonas, 187 F. Supp. 716
(N.D. Ala. 1960) (defendant was non-extraditable given his act as a government official oc-
curred in the aftermath of a political uprising).
107 See notes 73 and 82 supra and accompanying text.
108 641 F.2d at 520.
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The Quinn district court, in addition to denying that precedent
supported a membership requirement, also noted certain evidentiary
problems inherent in a membership requirement. The court asserted
that compelling the defendant to prove membership to a preponder-
ance 0 9 might infringe his fifth amendment protection against self-
incrimination, furnish circumstantial evidence of his guilt, and
prejudice his right to maintain his innocence." 0 The court also pre-
dicted practical problems in dealing with the membership require-
ment, such as the level of organization required to constitute a
political group and the degree of involvement required to constitute
membership in that group.' 1
The Quinn court's concerns, however, do not necessitate elimi-
nating a membership requirement. Since courts already consider
and evaluate membership in political offense determinations,' 2 re-
quiring defendants to prove membership merely acknowledges ex-
isting practice. Moreover, under the specialty doctrine," 3 the
requesting state can only try the defendant for the offenses for which
he is extradited. The accused, therefore, could not be tried for mem-
bership in an outlawed organization. Finally, past cases indicate that
the burden of proof in establishing membership would not be an on-
erous one." 1
4
109 Quinn, No. C-82-6688 RPA at 20. While noting that "no appellate court has yet held
what the burden of proof should be or where it should be placed," the magistrate required the
petitioner to plead, and prove by a preponderance of the evidence, each prerequisite to the
political offense exception. In re Quinn, No. CR-81-146 Misc. at 80. The magistrate, based his
holding on the analysis of the Mackin magistrate (In re Mackin, 80 Cr. Misc. 1, reprinted in
Hearings ofS 1639,supra note 66, at 182-86) and Lubet and Czackes (Lubet & Czackes, supra
note 25, at 208-10). In re Quinn, No. CR-81-146 Misc. at 81. The district court reached no
conclusion as to the burden of proof in political offenses. Quinn, No. C-82-6688 RPA at 47
n.6. For further discussion of the burden of proof issue, see Lubet, supra note 10, at 261-67,
274-79.
110 Quinn, No. C-82-6688 RPA at 20-21.
Il IId. at 21-22.
112 See notes 72, 83 and 107-09 supra and accompanying text.
113 Under the specialty doctrine, the requesting state may try the accused only for those
offenses for which the surrendering state agreed to extradite him. United States v. Rauscher,
119 U.S. 407, 420-21 (1886). The United States applies this doctrine unless it is excluded
from the applicable treaty. See M. BASSlOUNI, supra note 18, at 355. Article XII of the
United States-United Kingdom Extradition Treaty contains the appropriate provision. See
Treaty, supra note 3, art. XII.
114 In the recent IRA extradition cases, the courts noted past convictions for IRA mem-
bership, involvement of close relatives in the IRA, actions of the British indicating their suspi-
cions as to the accused's affiliations (such as surveillance, stopping and searching), and the
accused's prior IRA activities. In re Mackin, 80 Cr. Misc. 1, reprinted in Hearings on S. 1639,
supra note 68, at 223-30; In re McMullen, No. 3-78-1899 M.G., reprinted in Hearings on S. 1639,
supra note 66, at 295.
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Membership, therefore, is not merely evidence which implies
that an accused's particular offense was politically motivated. It is
also a necessary prerequisite to applying the political offense excep-
tion. In order to reflect court practice and precedent, a political of-
fense exception test must include a membership requirement.
In Quinn, the district court and magistrate agreed upon the na-
ture and proof of the political disturbance requirement in the polit-
ical offense definition. Both accepted the fact that the accused's
(Quinn's) evidence established a state of political unrest in the
United Kingdom during the period in question. 115 However, al-
though both agreed that finding the alleged act "incidental to" the
political disturbance was a prerequisite to applying the political of-
fense exception, 16 they interpreted this requirement differently. The
magistrate found Quinn's acts not incidental to the disturbance,
while the district court found to the contrary.' '
7
The district court rejected the magistrate's findings on two
grounds. First, the court declared that the magistrate had based her
determination on inappropriate considerations."" Second, the court
held that the magistrate had erred in relying on Eain in reaching her
conclusions. 119 Both these grounds reflect the different meanings the
magistrate and district court gave to the phrases "incidental to" and
115 In re Quinn, No. CR-81-146 Misc. at 95; Quinn, No. C-82-6688 RPA at 23. Their find-
ings on this point paralleled those of the magistrates in the other IRA cases, McMullen and
Mfackin. Although the political disturbance requirement is stated in exclusively temporal
terms, by necessity the spatial dimension must also be considered. In Quinn, the alleged acts
occurred, not in Northern Ireland, the principal territorial area of the political disturbance,
but in London, a separate geographical area. The magistrate in MfcMullen implicitly accepted
that the Northern Ireland "political disturbance" extended to England in holding a bombing
in North Yorkshire was part of the Northern Ireland conflict. The magistrate in Quinn went
beyond this and explicitly linked Northern Ireland with the entire United Kingdom in consti-
tutional (England and Northern Ireland are both part of the United Kingdom) (In re Quinn,
No. CR-81-146 Misc. at 95) and legal terms (the Prevention of Terrorism Act, unlike preced-
ing legislation against terrorism, applied to all of the United Kingdom, not just Northern
Ireland). Id at 94. In a similar vein, while the Eain court refused to take judicial notice of
the existence of a political and military conflict between Israel and its neighboring states and
national liberation movements in the Middle East, the magistrate did receive evidence re-
garding the geographic dimensions of such a conflict to establish that the act occurred at a
time of political disturbance. 641 F.2d at 519-21. The court's geographical delineation of the
conflict could be critical in determining whether or not the political offense exception applies
to a specific act. That is, if a Palestinian shoots an Israeli military attache in Paris, is the act
incidental to the Middle East conflict? Or, if an IRA member robs a Lloyds bank in Boston,
is this act incidental to the Northern Ireland conflict?
116 Quinn, No. C-82-6688 RPA at 16-17.
117 Quinn, No. C-82-6688 RPA at 43, 28.
118 Id. at 29.
119 Id. at 35-36.
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"in furtherance of." The magistrate adopted the stricter construction
of the Eain court, focusing on connecting the two clauses and requir-
ing a relationship between the accused, his act, and the goals of the
uprising. 20 The district court more broadly construed the phrases,
emphasizing the "incidental" clause and applying an occurrence ap-
proach. 21 Each court's approach essentially predetermined the fac-
tors considered in, and, hence, the ultimate finding of, whether the
alleged act was incidental to and in furtherance of the disturbance.
The district court and the magistrate disagreed on the impor-
tance of several factors, the most significant of which are two closely
related considerations: 1) the character of the acts; and (2) the identi-
ties of the victims. 22 Relying on Eain, the magistrate found that the
character of the acts, i.e., the mode and manner of the attacks, placed
them outside the historical context of the exception. 123 The district
court disregarded this in assessing the incidence of the act to the
political disturbance. In so doing, the district court rejected prece-
dents dating back to the source of the political offense exception, Cas-
tzni. In these cases, courts generally only applied the exception to
acts occurring during heated, spontaneous exchanges between com-
batants. Judge Hawkins, in an often quoted concurrence in Castionz',
stressed that violent acts may be excused as incidental to a political
uprising if done "in heat and in heated blood."'' 24 Also, in Orne/as v.
120 In re Quinn, No. CR-81-146 Misc. at 106-08.
121 Quinn, No. C-82-6688 RPA at 25-40, 41-44.
122 The courts also considered two other factors. First, the magistrate equated the alleged
acts' success in promoting the political disturbance with the "incidental to and in furtherance
of" requirement. In re Quinn, No. CR-81-146 Misc. at 110-11. The district court properly
rejected this conclusion, noting that courts have never evaluated the political effectiveness of
the alleged acts. Quinn, No. C-82-6688 RPA at 30. The court cited Judge Denman's state-
ment in Castioni for support. Id
Judge Denman stated: "[W]e cannot decide that question [whether an offense was
in the course of, and as part of a political uprising] merely by considering whether
the act done at the moment at which it was done was a wise act, in the sense of
being an act which the man who did it would have been wise in doing, with the
view of promoting the cause in which he was engaged."
Castioni, [1891] 1 Q.B. at 158.
The magistrate also found that the accused's acting without the direction of and/or for-
mal authorization from the PIRA bore upon the incidence requirement. In re Quinn, No. CR-
81-146 Misc. at 110-11. The district court again disagreed, noting that disturbances and
uprisings are inherently unorganized and consequently participants often act without formal
orders. Quinn, No. C-82-6688 RPA at 31. Thus, while evidence of official authorization
might indicate the act was "incidental to" or "in furtherance of" an uprising, absence of such
proof should not conclusively preclude the acts from being part of the disturbance.




RUI/,1 25 the only case in which the United States Supreme Court has
commented on the exception, the Court found that a magistrate was
correct in considering the circumstances surrounding the accused's
act.1 26 The Court specifically stated that the magistrate was justified
in refusing to apply the political offense exception "in view of the
character of the foray [and] the mode of the attack."'
27
The spontaneous nature of particular acts has also affected con-
temporary political offense cases. For example, the court granted the
political offense exception in Ramos v. Diaz 128 to a guard accused of
murder where an escaping prisoner had assaulted him. And in United
States v. Mackin,129 a court granted political offender status to the ac-
cused who, when confronted by a British soldier while fleeing arrest,
had shot the soldier.
Against this background, Quinn's alleged acts can be more accu-
rately evaluated. While Quinn's shooting of the constable could be
considered spontaneous, since he was escaping from possible arrest,
the bombings were undoubtedly premeditated and calculated acts.
Therefore, the character of the bombing acts falls outside the histori-
cal context of the incidence requirement of the political offense
exception.
The "character of the attack" is also a part of the second factor
on which the magistrate and district court disagreed in Quinn. Again
relying on Eain, the magistrate found that the identity of the victim
weighed heavily in the incidence requirement.1 30 The district court
disagreed, once again rejecting significant precedent. In both Omelas
v. Rui' 3 ' and Eain v. Wilkes, 132 where innocent civilians were killed,
the courts held that the acts were not incidental to the political upris-
ing. In Ruiz, the Court specifically listed "the persons killed or cap-
tured" as a factor to be considered.' 33 In Eain, the Second Circuit
stated:
The [political offense] exception does not make a random bomb-
ing intended to result in the cold-blooded murder of civilians in-
cidental to a purpose of toppling a government, absent a direct
link between the perpetrator, a political organization's political
125 161 U.S. 502 (1896).
126 Id. at 511-12.
127 Id. at 511.
128 179 F. Supp. at 462-63.
129 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981).
130 In re Quinn, No. CR-81-146 Misc. at 108-09.
131 161 U.S. 502 (1896).
132 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981).
133 161 U.S. at 511.
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goals, and the specific act. . . . Otherwise, isolated acts of social
violence undertaken for personal reasons would be protected sim-
ply because they occurred during a time of political upheaval, a
result we think the political offense exception was not meant to
produce.'
34
The district court's subsequent attempt to factually distinguish
Quinn from Eain does not stand up to scrutiny. The district court in
Quinn characterized Eain's marketplace bombing as being aimed di-
rectly at a civilian population, with the goal of eliminating a segment
of the population.1 3 5 It found that Quinn's bombings, in contrast,
were aimed at the government and thereby were incidental to the
goal of ending British rule. 36 This may correctly characterize the
bombs Quinn allegedly sent to government personnel, but only those.
The bombs Quinn allegedly placed in a pub, restaurant, and railway
station are undeniably different; these bombings are equivalent to
Eain's marketplace bombing. Innocent civilians would have been
killed in these attacks. Quinn's actions, therefore, because of this
threat to innocent civilian lives, exceed the historical scope of the
exception.
IV. Conclusion
In Quinn v. Robinson, a United States district court stated that the
executive and/or legislative branch must resolve the difficulties in-
herent in applying the political offense exception to terrorism.1
37
Some commentators have stated that this responsibility should rest
with the executive branch of the government. 38 Regardless of the
merits of these contentions, however, the reality is that the judiciary
currently decides this issue. Therefore, courts must formulate a viable
standard for determining what acts are protected by the exception.
Recently, in both Eain v. Wilkes 139 and United States v. Mackin ,140
courts have suggested a solution. One element of this solution is for
134 641 F.2d at 521.
135 Quinn, No. C-82-6688 RPA at 36.
136 Id. at 39-40.
137 Id. at 39.
138 For a discussion of the relative advantages and disadvantages of the respective ap-
proaches, see Hearings on S. 1639, supra note 66, at 29-64 (testimony of W. Hannay advocating
executive treatment); Lubet, supra note 10, at 267-91 (advocating judicial treatment); Stern-
berg & Skelding, supra note 87, at 152-71 (advocating judicial treatment); Note, Terrorist Extra-
dition and the Political Offense Exception:. An Administrative Solution, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 163-183
(1980) (advocating executive treatment).
139 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981).
140 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981).
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courts to require membership in a bona fide contending political
group. This would exclude from the political offense exception those
who engage in random acts of social violence. Another element of
the solution is for courts to require a closer relationship between the
political organization's goal and the violent act itself. In particular,
courts should focus on the character of the act and the identities of
the victims.
The political offense exception originated from a nineteenth-
century belief in the individual's right to agitate for political change,
even through violent means. Exempting political dissidents from ex-
tradition ensured that their freedom from prosecution and punish-
ment did not depend upon the success or failure of their actions.
Twentieth-century governments, and therefore courts, have contin-
ued to espouse this principle. However, terrorist acts, which often
are directed against purely civilian rather than government and mili-
tary targets, have moved beyond the parameters of the traditional
political offense inquiry.14 ' In response, just as the Seventh and Sec-
ond Circuits have done, the Ninth Circuit must adapt its application
of the political offense exception to distinguish between protected
political acts and unprotected acts of random violence.
Lloyd W Grooms
Jane M. Samson *
141 Recently, even the Republic of Ireland evidenced a willingness to differentiate be-
tween protected acts and the terrorist activities of the IRA, PIRA, and their offshoots. In
McGlinchey v. Wren, [1983] I.L.R.M. 169, the Irish Supreme Court granted Northern Ire-
land's extradition request for McGlinchey, one of the most wanted men in Ireland and the
suspected leader of the Ireland National Liberation Army. The Court stated that "modem
terrorist violence. . . is often the antithesis of what could reasonably be regarded as political.
Id. at 172.
Ironically, on St. Patrick's Day in 1984, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this order and the
recently-captured McGlinchey was handed over to Northern Ireland authorities. THE SUN-
DAY TIMEs (London), Mar. 18, 1984, at 1, col. 5.
* The authors researched and wrote this comment while studying at the University of
Notre Dame Concannon Programme of International Law in London.
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TAX LAW-COLLATERAL-PURPOSE THIRD-PARTY SUMMONSES:
WHAT'S LEFT OF I.R.C. SECTION 7609(0?
The "John Doe summons"' is a summons in which the Internal
Revenue Service ("Service") compels an individual to produce
records or testimony relating to unnamed others. The device enables
the Service to compel an entity2 to identify its constituents who the
Service suspects are evading taxes. While the device is an effective
tool in the Service's efficient enforcement of our tax laws, its overuse
could threaten individual privacy interests. In order to safeguard
such interests, Congress enacted Internal Revenue Code ("I.R.C.")
section 7609(0, 3 which restricts the use of these summonses.
Not all courts, however, have required the Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue ("Commissioner") to adhere to the congressional
John Doe summons safeguards. For example, in United States v. Tif-
fany Fine Arts, Inc.,4 the Service selected a tax shelter operation for
examination and summoned the operation's participant lists pursu-
ant to the general summons provision of section 7602. The Service
argued that the participant lists were relevant or material to its ex-
amination of the shelter operation. 5 Despite the Service's failure to
comply with section 7609(), the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit enforced the summonses. 6 The result of Tz:#uiny
Fine Arts is that the Service enjoys unfettered discretion in selecting
1 "Summons" refers to the investigative procedure through which the Internal Revenue
Service ("Service") compels individuals to produce records or testimony. See notes 10-12 infta
and accompanying text. In a John Doe summons, the object of the Service's investigation is
not the summonee, but the individuals implicated in the summoned records or testimony.
2 The Service has, for example, summoned the participant lists of abusive tax shelters.
See, e.g., United States v. Samuels, Kramer & Co., 712 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1983); Agricultural
Asset Mgmt. Co., v. United States, 688 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1982). The Service routinely sum-
mons the membership rosters of barter exchanges. See, e.g., United States v. Gottlieb, 712
F.2d 1363 (1 1th Cir. 1983); United States v. Thompson, 701 F.2d 1175 (6th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Barter Sys., 694 F.2d 163 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. Pittsburgh Trade Exch.,
644 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. Island Trade Exch., 535 F. Supp. 993 (E.D.N.Y.
1982); United States v. Constantinides, 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) T 9830 (D. Md. 1980),
motion for stay denied, 81-1 U.S. Tax Gas. (CCH) 9317 (D. Md. 1981). Potential applications
of the John Doe summons are limitless, extending to every circumstance in which one person
possesses information regarding unnamed others. See notes 126-27 infra and accompanying
text.
3 I.R.C. § 7609(o (West Supp. 1983); see notes 51-59 infra and accompanying text.
4 718 F.2d 7 (1983), cert. granted, 52 U.S.L.W. 3713 (U.S. Apr. 3, 1984) (No. 83-1007).
5 718 F.2d at 8-9.
6 Id. at 14.
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tax liabilities for- examination.7 The Tffkny Fine Arts rationale per-
mits the Service to use this discretion to select examinees for the col-
lateral purpose of identifying those examinees' participants, thus
avoiding section 7609(0. This comment reviews the propriety of ju-
dicial enforcement of such disguised John Doe summonses where the
Service has not complied with the congressional John Doe summons
safeguards.
Section 7602 permits the Service to summon books, documents,
or testimony for the purpose of examining the tax liability of any
person.8 The Service has used its section 7602 summons power for a
variety of collateral purposes. 9 This comment, however, reviews sec-
tion 7602 summonses issued by the Service to third-party
recordkeepers for the collateral purpose of identifying those
recordkeepers' participants.
Part I of this comment reviews the background of the Commis-
sioner's John Doe summons power, and then examines the scope of
congressional controls on that power. Part II analyzes the schism
that has developed among the courts of appeals on the Service's use
of its summons power for the collateral purpose of obtaining lists of
suspected tax evaders. Part II further tests this collateral purpose
problem in light of law and public policy. Part III concludes that
courts should require the Service to comply with section 7609(
whenever the Service selects an examinee with intent to identify that
examinee's participants.
I. The John Doe Summons Power
A. Origins
Congress' tax law enforcement scheme vests the Secretary of the
Treasury ("Secretary") and his delegates with broad summons
power. I.R.C. section 7601 charges the Secretary to investigate all
persons who may be liable for any federal tax. 10 To aid in these in-
vestigations, section 7602 empowers the Secretary to compel the pro-
duction of any books, documents, or testimony which may be
"relevant or material" to a federal tax liability of any person." If the
7 See note 10 infra and accompanying text.
8 See notes 10-12 infra and accompanying text.
9 For example, the Service has issued section 7602 summonses for the collateral purpose
of performing research. See note 75 infra and accompanying text.
10 I.R.C. § 7601 (West 1967).
11 I.R.C. § 7602 (West Supp. 1983) provides in pertinent part:
EXAMINATION OF BOOKS AND WITNESSES
(a) Authority to summon, etc.-For the purpose of ascertaining the correctness
[Vol. 59:10261
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
summonee fails to comply with such summons, section 7604 autho-
rizes the Secretary to bring enforcement proceedings in United States
district court.'
2
The Supreme Court's 1964 United States v. Powell' 3 decision has
endured as the benchmark delineating the bounds of the Commis-
sioner's summons power. In Powell, the Service issued a section 7602
summons to the proprietor of a laundry business.14 When the propri-
etor refused to comply with the summons, the Service instituted sec-
tion 7604 enforcement proceedings. 5 The proprietor argued that the
Service had not shown probable cause to suspect fraud, the sum-
mons' asserted basis, and that the summons was therefore invalid.1 6
The Court rejected this argument, saying that a probable cause stan-
of any return, making a return where none has been made, determining the liability
of any person for any internal revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity of any
trustee or fiduciary of any person in respect of any internal revenue tax, or collecting
any such liability, the Secretary or his delegate is authorized-
(1) To examine any books, papers, records, or other data which may be rele-
vant or material to such inquiry;
(2) To summon the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any
officer or employee of such person, or any person having possession, custody, or care
of books of account containing entries relating to the business of the person liable for
tax or required to perform the act, or any other person the Secretary or his delegate
may deem proper, to appear before the Secretary or his delegate at a time and place
named in the summons and to produce such books, papers, records, or other data,
and to give such testimony, under oath, as may be relevant or material to such
inquiry; and
(3) To take such testimony of the person concerned, under oath, as may be
relevant or material to such inquiry.
12 I.R.C. § 7604 (West Supp. 1983) provides in relevant part:
ENFORCEMENT OF SUMMONS
(b) Enforcement.-Whenever any person summoned under section . . . 7602
neglects or refuses to obey such summons, or to produce books, papers, records, or
other data, or to give testimony, as required, the Secretary may apply to the judge of
the district court or to a United States commissioner within which the person so
summoned resides or is found for an attachment against him as for contempt. It
shall be the duty of the judge or commissioner to hear the application, and, if satis-
factory proof is made, to issue an attachment, directed to some proper officer, for the
arrest of such person, and upon his being brought before him to proceed to a hear-
ing of the case; and upon such hearing the judge or the United States commissioner
shall have power to make such order as he shall deem proper, not inconsistent with
the law for the requirements of the summons and to punish such person for his
default or disobedience.
13 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
14 Id at 49. The summons issued from an investigation in which the Service sought to
determine whether the laundry business' tax returns had been fraudulently falsified. Id. at
50.
15 Id. at 49-51.
16 Id at 49, 53-54.
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dard for section 7602 summonses would unduly restrict the Commis-
sioner's investigations. 17 Instead, the Court established four
requirements for an enforceable section 7602 summons. The Com-
missioner must show that: (1) the investigation is pursuant to a legiti-
mate purpose; (2) the summons may be relevant to its stated purpose;
(3) the Service does not already possess the desired information; and
(4) the Code's administrative steps have been followed. 18 Since the
Powell summons met these criteria, the Court reversed the court of
appeals' decision denying enforcement. 19
In dictum, the Powell Court articulated the summonee's right to
challenge a section 7602 summons on "any appropriate ground" in a
section 7604 enforcement proceeding.20 The Court cautioned against
attempts by the Service to abuse district courts' process through pro-
ceedings to enforce summonses issued for an "improper purpose."
'2'
The Court listed harrassing taxpayers, pressuring them to settle col-
lateral disputes, or "any other purpose reflecting on the good faith of
the particular transaction" as examples of such improper purposes. 2
2
However, the Court placed on taxpayers the burden of proving such
abuse of process.
23
Eleven years after Powell, the Court reviewed the Service's use of
John Doe summonses in United States . Bisceglia. 24 In that case, a
bank deposited $40,000 in old, damaged $100 bills with the Cincin-
nati Branch of the Federal Reserve Bank.25 The Service suspected
that unreported income attended this deposit, and issued a section
7602 summons for the bank's deposit records.2 6 The bank refused to
comply, arguing that the summons failed to identify a specific tax-
payer under investigation.27 The Service responded by bringing a
section 7604 action in district court. 28
17 Id at 57-58.
18 Id
19 Id at 50, 59.




24 420 U.S. 141 (1975).
25 Id at 142.
26 Id at 142-43. The money could, for example, have represented proceeds realized by
the depositor in an unrecorded sale or treasure trove found by the depositor, either of which
constitutes gross income under I.R.C. § 61 (West 1967). See, e.g., Cesarini v. United States,
296 F. Supp. 3 (N.D. Ohio 1969), aj'd, 428 F.2d 812 (6th Cir. 1970) (old currency found in
piano constituted § 61 gross income to finder).
27 Id at 143, 149.
28 Id at 143-44.
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In ruling the Bisceglia summons enforceable, the Supreme Court
broadly deferred to the Commissioner's summons power and literally
interpreted the relevant statutes.2 9 The Court noted that section
7601 grants the Service a broad scope of investigation by permitting
inquiry into "all persons . . .who may be liable to pay any internal
revenue tax."'30 The Court observed that, additionally, section 7602
confers a broad summons power, authorizing the Service to summon
"any person" to give testimony or produce books or records which
may be "relevant or material" to the tax liability of "any person.
'31
The Court considered this broad summons power important to the
Commissioner's investigative efficiency and thus declined to nar-
rowly construe the language of section 7602 "absent unambiguous
direction from Congress.
'32
Dissenting in Bisceglia, Justice Stewart interpreted the section
7602 "tax liability of any person" language to require that a particu-
lar person's tax liability be the subject of an investigation by the
Service.33 Justice Stewart believed the Bisceglia summons lacked a
substantive basis for suspicion of fraud, and issued only on the mere
unusual character of a transaction. 34 Justice Stewart further rea-
soned that courts should review the revenue statutes for constitution-




The threat to individual privacy that Congress perceived in the
Biseglia holding prompted a swift legislative response. 36 In 1976,
Congress enacted I.R.C. section 7609 to regulate third-party sum-
monses.37 Section 7609(a) provides that when the Service issues a
section 7602 summons for the records38 of certain third parties, the
Service must notify persons "identified" in the summons.39 Any per-
29 Id. at 151.
30 Id. at 149 (emphasis in original).
31 Id; see note ll supra.
32 Id. at 150.
33 Id. at 153-56 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
34 Id at 156.
35 Id. at 159.
36 H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 306-07, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2897, 3202-03.
37 See I.R.C. § 7609 (West Supp. 1983).
38 Section 7609 summonses reach records (including books, papers, and other data) as
well as recordkeeper testimony. I.R.C. § 7609(c)(3) (West Supp. 1983).
39 I.R.C. § 7609(a), (c) (West Supp. 1983). The Service must mail this notice between
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son entitled to such notice may thereafter bring a proceeding under
section 7609( to quash the summons or intervene in its enforce-
ment.4° However, the section 7609 notice requirements apply to only
a limited group of third-party recordkeepers. These include (1)
"banks, savings and loan associations, credit unions, or similar as-
sociations ";41 (2) lawyers;42 (3) accountants; 43 (4) securities brokers;
44
(5) "persons extending credit through credit cards or similar de-
vices"; 45 (6) "consumer reporting agencies"; 46 and (7) barter ex-
twenty-three and three days prior to serving the summons on the recordkeeper. I.R.C.
§ 7609(a).
Recordkeepers served with a § 7609 summons must assemble for the Service the records
identified in the summons, I.R.C. § 7609(i)(1) (West Supp. 1983), and are immune from lia-
bility for their good faith compliance. I.R.C. § 7609()(3) (West Supp. 1983). Recordkeepers
refusing to comply with a court order to produce records or testimony under § 7609 risk being
held in contempt. I.R.C. § 7604; see note 12 supra.
Certain provisions allow the Service to forgo the notice requirements in particular situa-
tions. Section 7609 notice requirements do not apply when the Service summons to collect a
tax liability assessed by the Service or judgment rendered thereon. I.R.C. § 7609(c) (2) (B)
(West Supp. 1983). The Service may also forgo § 7609 when it summons solely to identify a
person having a numbered account at a financial institution. I.R.C. § 7609(c)(2)(A) (West
Supp 1983).
Finally, the Service may petition a district court and argue that reasonable cause exists
to believe the giving of notice may lead to attempts to obstruct or avoid an examination. If
the court agrees, the Service may bypass § 7609's notice requirements and the targeted tax-
payers lose their right to move to quash the summons or intervene in its enforcement. I.R.C.
§ 7 609(g) (West Supp. 1983).
40 I.R.C. § 7609(b) (West Supp. 1983). Moving to quash the summons or intervening in
its enforcement tolls the running of civil and criminal statutes of limitation with respect to the
tax liability targeted by the summons. I.R.C. § 7609(e) (West Supp. 1983).
41 I.R.C. § 7609(a)(3)(A) (West Supp. 1983). In Fink v. United States, 84-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) 9163 (E.D. Mo. 1983), a bank's subsidiary engaged in the business of servicing
mortgages. The court ruled the function performed by the subsidiary in relation to its cus-
tomers' accounts sufficiently similar to that of a traditional bank to make the subsidiary a
§ 7609(a)(3)(A) "similar association."
42 I.R.C. § 7609(a)(3)(E) (West Supp. 1983).
43 I.R.C. § 7609(a)(3)(F) (West Supp. 1983). Treas. Reg. § 301.7609-2(a)(1) (1984) de-
fines "accountant" for this purpose as any person "registered, licensed or certified under State
law as an accountant."
44 I.R.C. § 7609(a)(3)(D) (West Supp. 1983). The Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 3(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (1982), defines "broker" for this purpose as "any person en-
gaged. . . in effecting transactions in securities for the account of others." See, e.g., United
States v. Samuels, Kramer and Co., 712 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir. 1983) (limited evidentiary hear-
ing reguired before Service could enforce § 7609(0 summons against promoters of abusive tax
shelters); In re John Does, 83-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9702 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (summons
properly issued under § 7609(0 enforced against seller of forward exchange contracts without
evidentiary hearing, where third-party recordkeeper failed to proffer evidence of Service's
failure to comply in good faith with Powell criteria).
45 I.R.C. § 7609(a)(3)(0) (West Supp. 1983). Treas. Reg. § 301.7609-2(a)(3) (1984), pro-
vides that a "persons extending credit through . . . credit cards or similar devices" for this
purpose:
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changes.47 The Service, desiring its section 7602 summons power to
remain as unfettered as possible by section 7609's procedural require-
ments, has acheived some success in persuading courts to narrowly
construe these categories.
48
[G]enerally includes any person who issues a credit card. It does not include a
seller of goods or services that honors credit cards issued by other parties but does
not extend credit on the basis of credit cards or similar devices issued by itself.
Id. The Regulation further provides that:
[A]n object is a "similar device" to a credit card ... only if it is physical in nature,
such as a coupon book, charge plate, or a letter of credit. Thus, a person who ex-
tends credit by requiring. . . customers to sign sales slips without requiring use of
physical objects issued by that person is not a third party recordkeeper under section
7609(a) (3).
Id. In United States v. New York Tel. Co., 682 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1982), the Service issued a
§ 7602 summons for New York Telephone Company's billing records relating to taxpayer.
Taxpayer argued that the Company was a § 7609(a)(3)(C) "person extending credit" with
respect to taxpayer, and thus that taxpayer was entitled to intervene under § 7609(b) in the
ensuing § 7604 enforcement proceeding. Id. at 314. Taxpayer based this argument on the
Company's practices of extending credit to certain customers through credit cards and gener-
ally billing its customers one month in arrears. Id. at 316. Although the Company did not
extend credit to taxpayer through a credit card, the court granted taxpayer's motion to inter-
vene, as the credit records the Company maintained with respect to its credit card holders
were essentially identical to those it maintained with respect to taxpayer. Id. at 315, 319. The
court said:
Any other rule would make the question of standing to assert available defenses to
the production of records turn upon the fortuitous possession of a peice of plastic,
and the possibility that it was used at some point during the time period for which
the records are sought. Such a rule, we think, would elevate the technical form of a
transaction over its substance.
Id. at 318; see also United States v. Desert Palace, Inc., 79-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9296, at
86,672-73 (D. Nev. 1979) (court held that casino's exchange of money for negotiable instru-
ments constituted a § 7609(a)(3)(C) credit transaction since the § 7602 summons "was so
broadly worded that a reasonable person would conclude that the Government also was looking for
records of credit transactions between [the casino] . . . and . . . [the taxpayers]") (emphasis
in original). But see United States v. Exxon Co., 450 F. Supp. 472, 475-77 (D. Md. 1978)
(although lessee-recordkeeper extended credit through credit cards, the court held that the
lessee was not a section 7609(a)(3)(C) recordkeeper with respect to lessor-taxpayer, since
lessee's transactions with lessor had nothing to do with lessee's credit operations).
46 I.R.C. § 7609(a)(3)(B) (West Supp. 1983). The Fair Credit Reporting Act § 603(0, 15
U.S.C. § 1681a(0 (1982), defines "consumer reporting agency" for this purpose as:
[A]ny person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis,
regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating
consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the purpose of
furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and which uses any means of or facility
of interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing consumer reports.
47 I.R.C. § 7609(a)(3)(G) (West Supp. 1983). "Barter exchange" for this purpose "means
any organization of members providing property or services who jointly contract to trade or
barter such property or services." I.R.C. § 6045(c)(3) (West Supp. 1983).
48 See, e.g., Godwin v. United States, 564 F. Supp. 1209 (D. Del. 1983) (controlling share-
holder not third-party recordkeeper with respect to controlled corporations); United States v.
Capital Preservation Fund, 81-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9385 (N.D. Cal. 1981) (investment
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In addition to the controls placed upon summonses which iden-
tify the person whose tax liability the Service seeks to examine, Con-
gress provided special controls over the Service's power to issue a
John Doe summons.49 Section 7609( forbids the Service from issu-
ing these summonses50 unless the Service has established three facts
in an ex parte proceeding before a district court: (1) that the sum-
mons relates to an investigation of a particular person or ascertain-
able group or class of persons; (2) that a reasonable basis exists for
believing that such person or group or class of persons may fail or
may have failed to comply with any provision of any internal reve-
nue law; and (3) that the information sought through the summons,
including the targeted taxpayer's identity, is not readily available
from other sources.5 1
Section 7609 notice requirements do not apply to a section
7609(o summons. 52 Also, since section 7609 provides that only those
entitled to notice of a third-party summons may move to quash the
summons or intervene in its enforcement, 53 the susceptibility of a sec-
tion 7609(o summons to such action is uncertain. At a minimum,
the Supreme Court's Powell decision requires that the third-party
recordkeeper have an opportunity to contest the summons' enforce-
ment on "any appropriate ground."
5 4
fund not third-party recordkeeper with respect to investor). Courts have preferred substance
over form in this area. See, e.g., United States v. Exxon Co., 450 F. Supp. 472, 477 (D. Md.
1978); see note 45 supra. Thus, courts will not classify as within § 7609(a)(3) a relationship
grounding primarily in employment. See e.g., United States v. Income Realty & Mortgage,
612 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1979) (taxpayer employed by real estate brokerage firm), cert. denied
sub nom. West v. United States, 446 U.S. 952 (1980); Collorafi v. United States, 84-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) 9101 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (taxpayer employed by ailine); United States v.
Manchel, Lundy and Lessin, 477 F. Supp. 326 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (taxpayer employed by law
firm).
49 A "John Doe" summons is one that fails to identify the person whose tax liability the
Service seeks to examine. I.R.C. § 7609() (West Supp. 1983).
50 Section 7609(f) applies to any summons issued under section 7602's general summons
provision. I.R.C. § 7609(c), (). Thus, courts have held that § 7609() procedures are not
limited to summonses issued to one of § 7609(a)(3)'s seven categories of protected
recordkeepers. See, e.g., United States v. Mobil Corp., 543 F. Supp. 507, 516 (N.D. Tex.
1981); see also notes 41-48 supra and accompanying text.
51 I.R.C. § 7609(), (h)(1), (2) (West Supp. 1983).
52 I.R.C. § 7609(a)(4)(C) (West Supp. 1983). Indeed, since the Service issues such sum-
monses to identify the targeted taxpayers, prior notice to such taxpayers would be impossible.
53 I.R.C. § 7609(b)(1), (2) (West Supp. 1983).
54 United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 49, 58; see note 20 supra and accompanying text. In
Agricultural Asset Mgmt. Co., v. United States, 688 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1982), the court re-
stricted enforcement litigation of a § 7609(l) summons to the issue of the Service's compliance
with the four Powell tests. The court reasoned that litigating the Service's compliance with
§ 7609()'s three criteria at an enforcement proceeding would render the earlier ex parte pro-
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In formulating section 7609(f, Congress acknowledged the use-
fulness of the John Doe summons in civil tax investigations.55 Con-
gress expressed concern, however, over the potential of these
summonses to offend individual privacy rights.56 The section 7609(0
requirement of an ex parte proceeding before a district judge repre-
sents Congress' compromise between these two rival interests.57
II. The Collateral Purpose Question
The Commissioner has urged that third-party recordkeepers'
participant lists are relevant or material58 to such recordkeepers' tax
liabilities, and thus are within the Commissioner's section 7602 sum-
ceeding superfluous. Id. at 149. The court further argued that had Congress envisioned liti-
gation of the three § 7609(o tests, it would have required, in that section, notice and an
adversary hearing, instead of only an ex parte proceeding. Id. Other courts, however, have
allowed litigation of the Service's compliance with § 7609(0's three tests at a summons en-
forcement proceeding. See, e.g., United States v. Brigham Young Univ., 679 F.2d 1345, 1347-
48 (10th Cir. 1982), vacated for consideration of moolness, 103 S. Ct. 713 (1983); United States v.
Maxwell, 81-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9378, at 87,028 (D. Nev. 1981).
55 H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 307,reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2897, 3203.
56 Id. at 306, 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3202.
57 In reporting out § 7609(0, the House Ways and Means Committee said:
The use of the administrative summons, including the third-party summons, is
a necessary tool for the IRS in conducting many legitimate investigations concern-
ing the proper determination of tax. The administration of the tax laws requires
that the Service be entitled to obtain records, etc., without an advance showing of
probable cause or other standards which usually are involved in the issuance of a
search warrant. On the other hand, the use of this important investigative tool
should not unreasonably infringe on the civil rights of taxpayers, including the right
to privacy.
Id. at 306, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3202.
58 The question of whether a recordkeeper's participant lists are relevant or material to
its tax liability has not been litigated. Arguably, such lists could be relevant or material to a
recordkeeper's tax liability. Although the accounting profession's generally accepted auditing
standards do not control examinations conducted by the Service, those principles are illumi-
nating here. To determine whether an entity has properly reported its revenues, auditors
often communicate directly with a sample of the sources of that revenue. They then compare
the reported amounts to the revenues actually recorded by the entity in question. AMERICAN
INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS, U.S. AUDITING STANDARDS AS OF JUNE 1,
1983, at Au §§ 326.07, 326.15, 350.17 (1983); see also W. MEIGS, E. LARSEN, AND R. MEIGS,
PRINCIPLES OF AUDITING 445-50, 655 (6th ed. 1977). Thus, the Service could, for example,
argue that in an examination of an entity which markets tax shelters, it would be necessary
for the Service to communicate directly with a sample of the entity's customers as to the
commissions they paid to the entity. The Service could not select such a sample without
access to the entity's customer lists.
Although a recordkeeper's participant lists could be relevant or material to an examina-
tion of the recordkeeper's tax liability, those lists would be relevant or material only if the




mons authority. The courts of appeals for the Second, 59 Eighth,60
and Eleventh 6' Circuits have accepted this argument and enforced
section 7602 summonses issued to identify the summonee's partici-
pants, despite the Service's failure to comply with section 7609(f).
The Sixth Circuit,62 however, requires compliance with section
7609(o whenever the Service's motive in issuing a summons includes
the collateral purpose of identifying the summonee's participants.
Otherwise, the Sixth Circuit reasons, the Service could avoid section
7609(o requirements by simply selecting examinees whose records
would yield the desired information, thus thwarting the will of
Congress.
A. United States V. Tiffany Fine Arts, Inc.
Tzftany Fine Arts6 3 is the most recent decision enforcing a collat-
eral-purpose third-party summons despite the Service's noncompli-
ance with section 7609(f). In T7any Fine Arts, the Service examined a
holding company which had subsidiaries in the business of promot-
ing tax shelters.6 4 The Service sought to identify individuals to
whom these subsidiaries had sold licenses by issuing section 7602
summonses to the holding company.6 5 When the holding company
refused to comply with the summonses, the Service brought a section
7604 enforcement action in district court.6 6 The Commissioner ar-
gued that the licensee lists were necessary to determine whether the
holding company had properly reported licensing income on its con-
solidated tax return. 67 The holding company asserted that the Serv-
ice actually desired the lists for the collateral purpose of examining
the licensees' tax liabilities, and thus that the summonses could issue
only if the Service complied with section 7609(.
68
The Second Circuit enforced the summonses, basing its decision
59 See notes 63-90 in/ia and accompanying text.
60 See notes 76-81 in/a and accompnaying text.
61 See notes 82-90 in/a and accompanying text.
62 See notes 91-107 infra and accompanying text.
63 718 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 52 U.S.L.W. 3713 (U.S. Apr. 3, 1984) (No. 83-
1007).
64 718 F.2d at 8-9.
65 Id
66 The court observed that enforcement proceeded under §§ 7402(b) and 7604. Id at 9.
Section 7402(b), like § 7604(a), confers enforcement jurisdiction on United States district
courts. I.R.C. § 7402(b) (West 1967); I.R.C. § 7604(a) (West 1967). Section 7604(b) empow-
ers district judges or commissioners, upon satisfactory proof, to order summonses enforced.
See note 12 supra.
67 Tiny Fine Arts, 718 F.2d at 1; see note 58 supra.
68 718 F.2d at 9-10.
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on three grounds. First, the court stated that, as far as it could deter-
mine, Congress only intended section 7609(f to apply to situations
like BLzceglia in which the Service had issued a summons without any
interest in the recordkeeper's tax liability. 69 That the Service had a
collateral purpose was irrelevant. However, the court did not cite
any judicial or legislative authority for this determination.
Second, the court noted that every summons issued by the Serv-
ice implicates individuals other than the taxpayer named as the sub-
ject of the summons. 70 The court concluded that requiring the
Service to follow section 7609(o procedure each time the Service is-
sues a summons implicating individuals other than the taxpayer
named in the summons would unduly burden the Service. 7 In this
reasoning, however, the court overlooked the critical factor of the
Service's intent in selecting tax liabilities for examination. The
court's conclusion therefore became overinclusive, for in the vast ma-
jority of cases, the Service selects an examinee only because the ex-
aminee's tax liability genuinely concerns the Service. Requiring
compliance with section 7609( procedure only in cases where the
Service's purpose in selecting an examinee includes summoning the
examinee's participant lists would not unduly burden the Service.
72
No court has proposed requiring the Service to comply with section
7609(o whenever a summons implicates individuals not named in
the summons, absent intent by the Service to investigate those
persons.
Third, the court relied on case law. The court cited two lines of
cases that the court said analogously supported its decision to enforce
the Tiffny Fine Arts collateral-purpose third-party summonses. One
group of cases held that a section 7602 summons is enforceable even
if issued to investigate suspected criminal conduct, provided the
Service has not abandoned its pursuit of a civil tax determination or
collection? 3 These cases, however, did not involve a specific limita-
69 Id at 13.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Section 7604 enforcement proceedings provide summonees with an appropriate forum
for carrying their Powell-imposed burden of proving such collateral purpose. See note 12supra
and accompanying text; see also text accompanying note 23 supra.
73 Tffany Fine Arts, 718 F.2d at 13. These cases involved a common law rule which Con-
gress later made statutory in I.R.C. § 7602(c) (West Supp. 1983). Section 7602(c) forbids the
Service from issuing a summons with respect to any person for whom a Justice Department
referral is in effect. "Justice Department referral" for this purpose means either (1) a recom-
mendation by the Service to the Attorney General for a grand jury investigation or a criminal
prosecution of a suspected violation of federal tax law, or (2) a request, pursuant to I.R.C.
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tion on the Service's summons power, such as that embodied in sec-
tion 7609(), and thus are distinct from the Tzjny Fine Arts
scenario. 74 The other line of cases relied on by the Second Circuit in
Tifany Fine Arts held that a court may enforce a section 7602 sum-
mons issued by the Service for research purposes, provided a civil tax
determination also supports the summons.7 5 Gathering research,
however, is a far more innocuous collateral purpose than an intent to
investigate tax liabilities of the summonee's participants. The second
line of cases, then, represents a slender reed of support for the Tzjiny
Fine Arts holding.
The Second Circuit also found authority for its 7ffny Fine Arts
holding in United States v. Barter Systems, Inc. ,76 an Eighth Circuit deci-
sion. In Barter Systems, the Service selected a barter exchange for ex-
amination pursuant to section 7601 and issued a section 7602
§ 6103(h)(3)(B) (West 1980), by the Attorney General for information from the Service relat-
ing to a taxpayer under investigation. I.R.C. § 7602(a).
74 One of the cases cited by the court was United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 437
U.S. 298 (1978), in which a summonee asserted that the Service issued a § 7602 summons to
him solely to gather evidence for a criminal prosecution, in violation of the Powell good faith
criterion. See text accompanying note 22 supra. In enforcing the summons, the court found
that when the Service issued it, the Service had not recommended criminal prosecution of the
summonee to the Justice Department, but was merely investigating him. 437 U.S. at 318.
Thus, in issuing the summons, the Service did not violate the proscription against issuing a
summons to a person for whom a Justice Department referral is in effect. See note 73 supra.
Conversely, the Tzjany Fine Arts summonses did violate § 7609(0's specific limitation on the
Service's summons power.
75 Tfany Fine Arts, 718 F.2d at 13. One of the cases cited by the court, United States v.
First Nat'l Bank in Dallas, 635 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 916 (1981),
involved the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program ("TCMP"). In the TCMP, the
Service randomly selects a sample of tax returns and then examines those returns to deter-
mine the degree of taxpayer compliance with tax laws and to identify problem compliance
areas. Id at 393-94. In First Nat'l Bank, a TCMP examinee contested summonses issued to
three banks for documents relating to the examinee, arguing that a primary purpose of gath-
ering research data would not support issuance of a § 7602 summons. Id at 392-93. The
court rejected this contention and held that the Service could issue a § 7602 summons for
research purposes, provided an investigation of a particular tax liability also supported the
summons. Id at 396. Collateral-purpose third-party summonses, in which the Service selects
recordkeepers for examination with intent to summon the recordkeeper's participant lists,
bear little resemblance to TCMP's random selection process. Moreover, there is no authority
that the Service has ever summoned a recordkeeper's participant lists through TCMP.
The court also cited United States v. Pittsburgh Trade Exch., 644 F.2d 302, 308 (3d Cir.
1981) ("[it is] settled. . . law in this circuit that a dual purpose for issuance of a summons is
permissible, at least up until the. . . Service has made an institutional commitment to rec-
ommend prosecution, so long as one purpose is determination of the civil tax liability of
taxpayers") and United States v. Island Trade Exch., 535 F. Supp. 993 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (col-
lateral research purpose will not invalidate an otherwise valid summons).
76 694 F.2d 163 (8th Cir. 1982).
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summons for the exchange's membership lists. 77 The barter ex-
change opposed the summons, arguing that the Service actually
wanted the lists for the collateral purpose of examining the ex-
change's members, and that the summons should issue only after the
Service complied with section 7609(o.78 The Eighth Circuit found
this argument unpersuasive and enforced the summons.79 In so do-
ing, however, the Eighth Circuit relied heavily on United States v.
Euge.80 In Euge, the Supreme Court ruled the Service's summons
power valid absent an express statutoy prohibition. 81 Thus, the Eighth
Circuit's reliance on Euge seems misplaced, since section 7609(0 ex-
pressly prohibits enforcement of a John Doe summons where the
Service has not complied with section 7609(0.
Finally, the Second Circuit relied on United States v. Gottlieb ,82 an
Eleventh Circuit decision. In Gottlieb, a barter exchange-examinee
refused to comply with a section 7602 summons issued for its mem-
bership lists.83 In the ensuing section 7604 enforcement proceedings,
the district court ruled that it would enforce the summons only if the
Service either (1) renounced its intent to examine the exchange's
members, or (2) complied with section 7609(0.84 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court.85 The court
adopted the Barter Systems rationale that the Service may issue a sec-
tion 7602 summons for membership lists, provided the Service has a
legitimate interest in the summonee's tax liability.86 The court rea-
soned that denying enforcement of the summons would require the
Service to follow section 7609(0 procedure every time it examines a
recordkeeper, essentially precluding such examinations.87 In this rea-
77 Id at 164-65.
78 Id. at 165.
79 Id at 169.
80 444 U.S. 707 (1980).
81 Barter Systems, 694 F.2d at 167 (quoting Euge, 444 U.S. at 715) (court's emphasis). Euge
did not involve the express limitation on the Service's summons power embodied in § 7609(f).
Rather, Euge concerned whether § 7602 empowered the Service to compel a person to give
handwriting exemplars. Euge, 444 U.S. at 709. After reviewing the history of the summons
power, and noting that "[t]he compulsion of handwriting exemplars has been the subject of
far less protection than the compulsion of testimony and documents," id at 718, the Supreme
court enforced the Euge summons. Id at 719.
82 712 F.2d 1363 (1lth Cir. 1983).
83 Id. at 1365.
84 Id at 1366.
85 Id. at 1370.
86 The court relied on the same Euge passage used by the Eighth Circuit in Barter Systems.
Id at 1368; see note 81 supra.
87 Gottlieb, 712 F.2d at 1368-69. The court did not indicate how a contrary holding
would make it impossible for the Service to examine recordkeepers.
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soning, however, the court, like the Second Circuit in Tiany Fine
Arts,88 failed to consider the key element of the Service's intent in
issuing summonses.
In dictum, the Eleventh Circuit recognized two circumstances in
which recordkeelers could successfully challenge collateral-purpose
third-party summonses. First, the court said that a recordkeeper
could allege that the Service's examination was a "mere pretext or
subterfuge" to obtain the recordkeeper's participant lists.89 Second,
the court noted that a summonee could assert that a summons vio-
lates the Powell good faith requirement 0 Thus, Gottlieb represents no
more than a qualified, endorsement of the collateral-purpose third-
party summons.
In summary, both Barter Systems and Gottlieb represent questiona-
ble authority for the 7ifany Fine Arts holding. The Eighth Circuit's
Barter Systems decision rests on a doubtful interpretation of precedent.
And in Gottlieb, the Eleventh Circuit, like the Second Circuit in TZf-
fany Fine Arts, failed to consider the critical factor of the Service's
intent in issuing summonses.
B. United States v. Thompson
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit expressed its position
on the collateral-purpose third-party summons question in United
States v. Thompson.91 In Thompson, the Service selected a barter ex-
change for examination pursuant to section 760192 and issued a sec-
tion 7602 summons for transaction lists which identified the
exchange's members.93 When the exchange declined to comply with
the summons, the Service brought section 7604 enforcement proceed-
ings. 94 Service personnel testified at the proceedings that they in-
tended to use the summoned lists to examine the tax liabilities of the
exchange's members.95
The Sixth Circuit ruled the summons invalid, since it failed to
88 See notes 70-72 supra and accompanying text.
89 Gotlhieb, 712 F.2d at 1369; see a/to 'United States v. Constantinides, 81-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 9317, at 86,822 (D. Md. 198 1),denying motionfor stayfrom 80-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1
9830 (D. Md. 1980) (court enforced § 7602 summons for a barter exchange's membership
lists, saying in dicta that the exchange "may protect [its]. interests by seeking suppression of
the names of the . . . members . . . in any enforcement proceeding").
90 Gottlieb, 712 F.2d at 1369-70.
91 701 F.2d 1175 (6th Cir. 1983).
92 Id at 1176.
93 Id at 1175, 1177.
94 Id at 1177.
95 Id
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comply with section 7609(.96 Looking to the statute's legislative his-
tory, the court noted that section 7609(o emerged from Congress'
concern, in the wake of Bisceglia, for individual privacy rights.97 The
court noted that, in reporting out section 7609(f), the House Ways
and Means Committee expressed its intent that section 7609(f) apply
to any John Doe summons issued by the Service.98 The court was
unwilling to allow collateral-purpose third-party summonses to
transgress this clear expression of congressional intent.99 The court
implied that Congress would not have restricted the Service's sum-
mons power by enacting section 7609(f), if it had intended to grant
the Service discretion to defeat those restrictions in another stat-
ute.'°° Moreover, the court suggested that the Service's use of its sec-
tion 7602 summons power to procure participant lists in avoidance of
section 7609(f) probably would violate the Powell legitimate purpose
test. °
96 Id
97 Id at 1180. The court also observed that § 7609(0 represented Congress' attempt to
balance this concern for privacy rights with the policy of administrative efficiency. Id; see
notes 55-57 supra and accompanying text.
98 Thompson, 701 F.2d at 1180. The Ways and Means Committee said:
The committee believes that many of the problems in this area would be cured
if the parties to whom the records pertain were advised of the service of a third-
party summons, and were afforded a reasonable and speedy means to challenge the
summons where appropriate. While the third-party [recordkeeper] also has this
right of challenge, even under present law, the interest of the [recordkeeper] in pro-
tecting the privacy of the records in question is frequently far less intense than that
of the person to whom the records pertain.
In the case of a John Doe summons, advance notice to the taxpayer is obviously
not possible. Here the committee decided that the IRS agent should be required to
show adequate grounds for serving the summons in an independent review process
before a court before any such summons can be served.
H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 307, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2897, 3203 (emphasis added).
99 The court said:
We do not believe that the IRS can avoid the requirements of section 7609(0 merely
by identifying the record keeper as a person with respect to whose liability the sum-
mons is issued. Nor do we believe that even a legitimate investigation of a record
keeper's own tax liability can be used to exempt the IRS from following section
7609(0 procedures when at the time of its issuance a summons in fact also pertains
to the liability of other identified persons. To hold otherwise would present the IRS
with an irresistable invitation to avoid the clear Congressional safeguards of
§ 7609(0.
Thompson, 701 F.2d at 1179 n.8.
100 Id. at 1179-80.
101 Id at 1178. The court also noted that the Service had internally recognized the ra-
tionale of its holding. Id. at 1176. As a result of the Service's "Barter Exchange Project" then
underway, the Service's manual provided in pertinent part:
If the operator of the exchange declines to furnish the identities of participants and
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The significance of the Sixth Circuit's Thompson decision is the
importance the court placed on the Service's intent in issuing sum-
monses. The court held that the Service must comply with section
7609() when it issues a summons with a clear intent to investigate
unknown third parties. 10 2 The court said that the required intent
probably does not exist when there is only a remote possibility of
discovering information which would lead to examination of these
unidentified taxpayers. 0 3 The court dismissed distinctions between
a primary and secondary intent to investigate unknown third parties,
saying that "[i]t is enough that the intent was a motivating factor in
the issuance of the summons."' 10 4 Presumably, whether the Service
possesses the necessary intent is a question for the trier of fact.
The Sixth Circuit said that its Thompson holding would not un-
duly burden the Service. 10 5 In limiting its holding to cases in which
both (1) the Service issues a summons with intent to examine un-
known third parties, and (2) there is more than a remote possibility
of the Service discovering the identity of such third parties, the court
suggested that its holding would not apply to the vast majority of
summonses issued by the Service. 106 Moreover, the court noted that
even where section 7609( procedures do apply, those procedures im-
pose only slight burdens on the Service.
0 7
In summary, the courts of appeals are sharply divided on the
collateral-purpose third-party summons question. The Sixth Cir-
cuit's Thompson decision, though the minority position, reflects clearer
reasoning and a more accurate interpretation on the congressional
intent underlying section 7609 () than Tz 'ny Fine Arts, Barter Systems,
or Gottlieb.
C. Constitutional and Public Policy Issues
Collateral-purpose third-party summonses raise constitutional
issues that courts have not discussed thus far. Judicial enforcement
details of their transactions, a John Doe summons should be issued after consulta-
tion with District Counsel. The provision of Section 7609(l) . ..must be followed
before a John Doe summons is issued.
Id (quoting MANUAL SUPPLEMENT 45G-324, DEPT. OF TREAS., IRS § 7.021 (March 11,
1980).
102 701 F.2d at 1180. The necessary intent must exist in an "institutional sense." Id
Thus, such intent could exist even if not possessed by the examining agent. Id
103 Id
104 Id at 1181 (emphasis added).
105 Id at 1180.
106 Id at 1180-81.
107 Id at 1180.
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of these summonses infringes on three rights protected by the liberty
component of the fifth amendment's due process clause.108 These are
the right to freely contract, the right to enjoy a statutory entitlement,
and the right to privacy in economic affairs. The Supreme Court has
recognized all three of these rights, albeit in different contexts.
The Supreme Court has recognized the right to freely contract
as within the liberty component of the fifth amendment's due process
clause.' 0 9 Undeniably important is an individual's right to engage in
lawful economic transactions without governmental interference.
Section 7609(D provides minimal procedural safeguards to protect
individuals' economic transactions from unrestricted inquiry by the
IRS. Nonenforcement of section 7609(D could prompt individuals to
economically disassociate themselves from persons who are likely
targets of collateral-purpose third-party summonses. Thus, enforce-
ment of collateral-purpose third-party summonses arguably infringes
on the right of individuals to freely contract.
The Supreme Court recently recognized, in Hewitt v. Helms," 0
the right to procedural due process before deprivation of a statutory
entitlement. In Hewitt, a Pennsylvania statute established the proce-
dures prison officials must follow to lawfully confine a prisoner to
segregated quarters.' The court held that the statute conferred on
prisoners a protected liberty interest in remaining in the general
prison population, absent compliance with the statutory proce-
dures.1 2 In enacting section 7609(D, Congress similarly conferred on
taxpayers a protected liberty interest in not having their names dis-
closed in response to an IRS summons, absent the Service's compli-
ance with section 7609() procedures. Enforcement of summonses in
disregard of the section 7609() procedural safeguards thus deprives
targeted taxpayers of a statutory entitlement conferred on them by
Congress.
The Supreme Court first recognized the right of individual pri-
vacy in "penumbras . . . formed by emanations" from the first,
third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments. 1 3 The Court has since
108 The liberty component of the fifth amendment's due process clause provides that "[n]o
person shall . .. be deprived of ... liberty ... without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amend. V.
109 Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972) (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
110 103 S. Ct. 864 (1983).
111 Id at 867.
112 Id at 871.
113 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
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established that the liberty components of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments' due process clauses encompass the privacy right, 1 4 and
that John Doe summonses encroach on targeted taxpayers' pri-
vacy. '1 5 Section 7609( minimally protects this privacy right from
inquiry by the Service. Enforcement of summonses that contravene
the section 7609(f safeguards therefore violates the economic privacy
rights of targeted taxpayers.
Judicial enforcement of collateral-purpose third-party sum-
monses, then, deprives targeted taxpayers of three interests protected
by the liberty component of the fifth amendment's due process
clause. In Mathews v. Eldi'dge,116 the Supreme Court established
three factors courts must consider in determining what process must
attend constitutional deprivation of a protected liberty interest: (1)
the private interest affected by the governmental action; (2) the risk
of erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute safe-
guards; and (3) the government's interest, including the function in-
volved and the final and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedutes would entail. 1" 7 This balancing test pro-
vides the framework for determining whether enforcement of collat-
eral-purpose third-party summonses deprives targeted taxpayers of
the enumerated liberty interests without due process of law.
Under the first Eldidge factor, the "private interests" affected by
collateral-purpose third-party summonses are, as previously stated,1
targeted taxpayers' rights to freely contract, enjoy a statutory entitle-
ment, and economic privacy. Applying the second Eldridge factor,
section 7609(0 provides individuals with some protection from erro-
neous deprivation of these interests." 9 Under the third Eldridge fac-
tor, the government's interest in urging enforcement of collateral-
purpose third-party summonses is in efficient enforcement of the rev-
enue laws. In upholding the Commissioner's summons power, the
114 See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 384 U.S. 374, 383-85 (1977); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376-79 (1971);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
115 In enforcing the Bisceglia John Doe summons, the Court said:
Although such investigations unquestionably involve some invasion of privacy, they
are essential to our self-reporting system, and the alternatives could well involve far
less agreeable invasions of house, business, and records.
United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 146 (1975).
116 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
117 d at 335.
118 See notes 109-14 supra and accompanying text.
119 See notes 49-54 supra and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court has consistently expressed its view that an effective
revenue-raising agency is an integral component of the federal gov-
ernment. 120 Given the Court's view, the procedural safeguards of
section 7609(o probably satisfy the Eldridge balancing test. Thus, ju-
dicial enforcement of collateral-purpose third-party summonses
where the Service has complied with section 7609( deprives
targeted taxpayers of protected liberty interests with due process of
law.
However, enforcement of collateral-purpose third-party sum-
monses where the Service has not complied with section 7609( de-
prives targeted taxpayers of these protected liberty interests with no
process whatsoever. Such summonses issue pursuant to section 7602,
which provides procedural safeguards to persons named in the sum-
mons. 121 Since collateral-purpose third-party summonses do not
name the targeted taxpayers, enforcement of these summonses de-
prives targeted taxpayers of not only the benefit of a section 7609(f
ex parte hearing, but also of their section 7602 notice and procedural
rights. Therefore, enforcement of collateral-purpose third-party
summonses deprives the unnamed taxpayers of protected liberty in-
terests without due process of law.
In addition to legal rights and interests, public policy concerns
are also involved when the Service issues collateral-purpose third-
party summonses. These policy concerns are fourfold. Congress con-
sidered two of these concerns in evaluating the propriety of John Doe
summonses after the Supreme Court's decision in Bisceglia.122 First,
Congress acknowledged that the federal -government has a legitimate
interest in the Service's efficient enforcement of duly enacted revenue
laws.123 Second, Congress recognized that collateral-purpose third-
party summonses threaten important individual rights. 24 Section
7609(o represented Congress' balance between these competing
120 In Powell, the Court said:
Although a more stringent interpretation is possible, one which would require
some showing of cause for suspecting fraud, we reject such an interpretation because
it might seriously hamper the Commissioner in carrying out investigations he thinks
warranted, forcing him to litigate and prosecute appeals on the very subject which
he desires to investigate ....
379 U.S. at 53-54; see also Euge, 444 U.S. at 714-16; Bisceglia, 420 U.S. at 146, 150.
121 Section 7609(a)'s notice provision and § 7609(b)'s motion to quash and intervention
provisions apply to any summons issued pursuant to § 7602. I.R.C. § 7609(c)(1) (West Supp.
1983); see notes 36-48 supra and accompanying text.
122 See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
123 See note 55 supra and accompanying text.




Third, the Service could issue collateral-purpose third-party
summonses to a broad spectrum of recordkeepers. Thus far, the
Commissioner has substantially confined use of the device to barter
exchanges and tax shelter operations. However, extended use of the
device to extract the client lists of a professional, such as a lawyer
26
or an accountant, 27 could injure not only the targeted clients, but
also the summonee-professional. Section 7609(f) judicial review re-
quirements minimally protect these interests from unfounded use of
the Commissioner's John Doe summons power.
Finally, federal courts must enforce the Constitution and laws of
the United States. 28 The Second, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits' de-
cisions enforcing collateral-purpose third-party summonses contra-
vene Congress' clearly-expressed intent in enacting section 7609(f).1
29
Selective judicial enforcement of constitutional legislative enact-
ments could engender disrespect among the citizenry for all laws.
In summary, judicial enforcement of collateral-purpose third-
125 See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
126 The attorney-client privilege, however, protects communications between a lawyer
and his client from administrative summonses. In Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383
(1981), the Service issued a § 7602 summons to a corporation's general counsel. The sum-
mons sought the lawyer's files relating to an investigation he had undertaken to identify any
payments made by the corporation to foreign government officials. Id at 386-87. The Court
refused to enforce the summons based on both the attorney-client privilege and the work
product doctrine. Id at 396-97, 401-02. The Court noted that "the privilege exists to protect
not only the giving of professional advice to those who can act on it but also the giving of
information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and informed advice." Id at 390.
Arguably, this "information" includes client names. However, lists of client names are more
administrative in nature than the litigation-anticipating files in Upjohn and a court could find
that the attorney-client privilege does not protect them from summonses.
127 An accountant-client privilege does not exist for federal tax purposes. In United
States v. Arthur Young & Co., 52 U.S.L.W. 4355 (U.S. Mar. 20, 1984) (No. 82-687), the
Service issued a § 7602 summons for an accountant's "tax accrual workpapers" that analyzed
a corporation's contingent tax liabilities. In opposing the summons, the accountant asserted
that a work-product doctrine should immunize such workpapers from summonses issued by
the Service. Id at 4357. The accountant argued that such a doctrine would enhance the
integrity of the securities markets by encouraging publicly-held corporations to fully disclose
their tax matters to their independent accountants. Id at 4359. The Supreme Court declined
to adopt a tax accrual workpaper privilege for accountants. Id at 4360. The Court said that
the policy of full corporate disclosure should be weighed against the policy of efficient federal
revenue collection and that this balancing was solely within Congress' domain. Id The
Court was unwilling to restrict the Service's traditionally broad summons power absent ex-
press direction from Congress. Id at 4358 (citing United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 711
(1980));see also Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973) (no confidential accountant-
client privilege exists under federal law). Thus, it is unlikely that the Court would find that
privilege restricts the Service's power to summon an accountant's lists of client names.
128 Judiciary Act of 1789, § 8, 1 Stat. 73, 76 (1845).
129 See notes 97-100supra and acompanying text.
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party summonses deprives targeted taxpayers of protected liberty in-
terests without due process of law. The Sixth Circuit's Thompson de-
cision provides minimal procedural safeguards to protect the liberty
interests of targeted taxpayers threatened by collateral-purpose
third-party summonses. Moreover, public policy considerations sup-
port the Thompson position.
III. Conclusion
The John Doe summons is important to the federal revenue rais-
ing system. Unbridled, however, the IRS' use of the device threatens
Americans' rights to contractual freedom and economic privacy.
Congress attempted to balance these rival interests by enacting
I.R.C. section 7609(f. Nonetheless, some courts have allowed the
Service to bypass the congressional John Doe summons safeguards.
These courts have allowed the Service to select third-party
recordkeepers for examination and then use its general summons
power to procure those recordkeepers' participant lists. This practice
deprives individuals of their right to enjoy a statutory entitlement
embodied in section 7609(f.
Congress should give effect to the intent it expressed in enacting
section 7609(f and remove the ambiguity that some courts have read
into that statute. Congress could do this by enacting a law requiring
the Service to follow section 7609( procedure whenever the Service
issues a summons with the intent to identify the summonee's partici-
pants. Until Congress so acts, however, courts should decline to en-
force collateral-purpose third-party summonses. By enforcing these
summonses, the Second, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits are granting
the Commissioner discretion to circumvent an act of Congress.
Stephen j. Dunn
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